Dissenting Opinion

Is the Chief Justice in the line of succession to the Presidency?

2010-01-18T02:28:00.000-08:00

Matias Defesor said that the Chief Justice “is the most important appointment vested by the Constitution to the President” being fifth in line of succession to the Presidency.

Similarly, in his January 12 column in Manila Standard, Emil Jurado, a veteran journalist and lawyer, stated the following :

But a hiatus in the office of the chief justice poses clear and present danger to the country. There is the order of succession to the presidency: a Chief Justice is fifth in line. If there’s no President, Vice President, Senate President and Speaker of House of Representatives proclaimed by June 30, who will take over the country?

Is the Chief Justice really fifth in order of succession to the Presidency?

The answer in the negative. There is no provision in the Constitution that says expressly or by implication that the Chief Justice is fifth in line of succession to the Presidency.

To be sure, let me quote the relevant provisions of the Constitution on presidential succession.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

Even in the United States, the Chief Justice is not in the line of succession to the Presidency per Presidential Succession Act of 1947.

Appointment of New Chief Justice

2010-01-18T00:34:00.000-08:00

Among the arguments proffered by several legal luminaries on whether or not the incumbent president may appoint a new chief justice vis-à-vis the constitutional prohibition against ‘midnight appointment' and command that any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, the one submitted by Fr. Bernas, which is mainly anchored on the principles of statutory construction, is more convincing.

Bernas sees no conflict between such prohibition (Sec. 15, Art. VII) and command (Sec. 4.1, Art. VIII) of the Constitution if the new president appoints the next chief justice.

Let me reproduce in its entirety the article written by Bernas on this issue, viz :

I had originally planned to continue my dialogue with CHEd on the issue of collegiality, but the issue of who should appoint the next chief justice has grown more sexy. Collegiality can wait.

Since, however, there are so many issues involved regarding the appointment of a chief justice after CJ Puno retires on May 17, I shall write in telegraphic style.
It is important to remember that the prohibition against appointments two months before a presidential election until the end of the incumbent’s term was inspired by the reprobation by the Supreme Court of President Garcia’s scandalous “midnight appointments” before President Diosdado Macapagal assumed office.
But the prohibition against midnight appointments in Article VII is general, whereas the command in Article VIII to fill the vacancy in 90 days is special to the Supreme Court. An accepted principle is that a special law creates exception to a general law.

But again Article VII is in negative language, whereas Article VIII is positive. Another accepted principle is that negative language carries stronger weight in law than positive.

However, when laws are apparently in conflict, jurisprudence also says that efforts should be made to give effect to both when possible. Is reconciliation possible?

Yes, it is possible. The prohibition against appointment starts March 10 and lasts only until June 30; the period for filling a vacancy (90 days) lasts until Aug. 17. The new President will therefore still have about 45 days after June 30 to make the appointment. Both Article VII and Article VIII can have effect.

The original period proposed for filling vacancy in the Supreme Court was 60 days; it was extended to 90 days without debate. [See Constitutional Commission deliberations.] Thus even the Constitution believes that the vacancy can wait 90 days. There is no rush to amend the Constitution now.

Moreover, according to the Aytona case (1962) and the Valenzuela case (1998), when the president-elect is known, the authority of the incumbent is only to ensure an orderly transfer of power. Call it an argument from morality or delicadeza. Under the automated elections, we should know who the next President will be by May 17 or soon after.

The power to appoint is activated only when a vacancy occurs. Vacancy will occur only on May 17. But by then President Arroyo will only have power to make temporary appointments in the executive department. (Speaker Nograles’ contrary view is a premature attempt to amend the Constitution.)

Appointment is a two-way street: it involves offer and acceptance. A justice who accepts a prohibited appointment is complicit in the violation of the prohibition and opens himself or herself to impeachment for culpable violation of the Constitution.

Appointment to fill an anticipated vacancy is valid only if the person making the appointment still has the power when the vacancy occurs.

The President can appoint only from a list given by the JBC. Cory Aquino made appointments without a JBC list, as Senate President Enrile correctly recalls, but only when there was as yet no JBC.

The JBC is duty-bound to submit a list, but only when there is a vacancy, not necessarily sooner.

However, the JBC has no authority to decide whether Arroyo can appoint or not. The JBC can only prepare a list for whoever has authority to appoint. The JBC is not the Supreme Court.

In substantive issues, the chief justice has only one vote out of 15. In administrative matters, the CJ’s absence can be handled, and has always been handled, internally by the other justices of the Supreme Court through a designated temporary presiding officer. To say that the 14 remaining justices will not be able to temporarily run the Supreme Court properly without a chief justice is to insult all of them, one of whom will almost certainly be the next chief justice.

Problems that can arise during the coming elections do not necessarily need a chief justice. (1) Administrative matters go to the Comelec first. (2) Contests in local elections go to local courts first or to the Commission on Elections. (3) Contests in congressional elections go to the Senate or House Electoral Tribunals where a chief justice does not participate. (4) Presidential election contests go to the Supreme Court; but the Chief Justice is not the Supreme Court. At most his is only one vote out of 15. (5) The same can be said about appeals to the SC of election cases. The quorum of the Court en banc is only eight, not 15.

The only instance I can think of where the presence of the chief justice might be indispensable is when the President is on trial on impeachment. But I cannot see that coming any time soon.

What is dangerous for the nation is not the temporary absence of a chief justice but the possible conversion of the Supreme Court into a play-thing of political powers. The Supreme Court itself should resist this. The Supreme Court boat is already listing, weighted as it is by, among others, threatening endless reconsideration of decisions.

My suspicion arising from all of this is that the rush to appoint a chief justice before the swearing in of a new President is being orchestrated, out of unfounded fears or unstated political reasons, by forces in and around the Palace.

A final word. Those who want President Arroyo to appoint the next chief justice might attempt to persuade CJ Puno to retire much earlier than two months before the elections. That would not be a solomonic solution but an unwelcome political solution. I doubt, though, that CJ Puno would want to leave that as his legacy after a distinguished career in law.

Why Ban Airsoft During Election Period?

2010-01-06T04:35:00.000-08:00

Starting 9 February 2010 a total gun ban will be in effect nationwide until 9 June 2010 according to Comelec Resolution 8714 dated 14 December 2009.

Many airsoft enthusiasts ask this question : “Are airsoft guns included in the Comelec gun ban?”.

Section 2 of the said Resolution defines “firearm” as follows:

Firearm shall refer to the “firearm” as defined in existing laws, rules and regulations. The term also includes airgun, airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation in whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to believe that they are real.

Is the Comelec correct in including airsoft guns in the definition of firearm?
Consider the definition of ‘firearm’ in existing laws, rules and regulations.

Section 877 of the Revised Administrative defines “firearm” as follows:

Firearms or arms as herein used, include rifles, muskets, carbines, shotguns, revolvers, pistols, and all other deadly weapons from which a bullet, ball, shot shell, or other missile may be discharged by means of gunpowder or other explosives. The term also includes air rifles except such as being of small caliber and limited range and use as toys. The barrel of any firearm shall be considered a complete firearm.

PNP Circular No. 8 (13 September 2006) defines airsoft rifle/pistol as follows:

Airsoft rifle/pistol herein used includes battery operated, spring and gas type powered rifles/ pistol which discharge plastic or rubber pellets only as bullets or ammunition.

Airsoft rifle/pistol as a toy shall refer to those manufacture purposely as replica of a real armament with all its specifications and corresponding intellectual property sign or logo.

It is clear from the foregoing definitions that an airsoft gun is classified as a ‘toy airgun’ by PNP regulations and falls under the exception of an existing statute defining what a firearm is.

Since an airsoft gun is not a firearm (but rather a toy airgun), I submit that the Comelec has erred in expanding the definition of firearm which now includes airsoft guns?

Basic is the rule in administrative law that administrative agencies (such as the Comelec) may exercise only such powers as are expressly granted or delegated to them by law. The authority of the Comelec to regulate the carrying and transporting of “firearms” during election period is an express delegation of power derived from law (i.e., Sec. 32 and 33 of R.A. 7166).

The Comelec is supposed to issue rules and regulations that are consistent with existing laws and must act within the confines of its delegated authority under R.A. 7166.

Moot and Academic

2009-12-12T11:56:00.000-08:00

Does the lifting of Proclamation No. 1959 render the petitions of Jovito Salonga et. al. challenging the legality of Proclamation No. 1959 which imposed martial law in Maguindanao moot and academic?

A case is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by reason of supervening events. In the case of the present petitions, the supervening event is the lifting of Proclamation No. 1959 on 12 December 2009.

As a general rule, such petitions may be dismissed on ground of mootness. However, this general rule admits of exceptions, namely :

1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution.

2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved.

3) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public.

4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

I submit that the above exceptions are present and therefore the Supreme Court is bound to resolve the petitions filed by Salonga and other personalities.

Cory On My Mind

2009-07-27T22:35:00.000-07:00

In 1985 the reluctant Cory was convinced to run for president to unify the fragmented opposition. If she did not run for president, Marcos could have handily crushed the divided opposition in the 1986 snap presidential election namely Salvador Laurel (UNIDO), Aquilino Pimentel (PDP-Laban), Jovito Salonga (LP-Salonga Wing) and Eva Estrada Kalaw ( LP-Kalaw Wing) who were all hell-bent to run for president.

04 Feb 1986. Huge crowd of Cory Aquino supporters at the election campaign rally in Luneta Park.

The key to the EDSA revolution was the voice of Cory. If she did not run for president there would perhaps have been no EDSA. We would probably not have the freedom we are enjoying today.

We owe our democracy to Cory. At 76, Cory remains a moral and political force. A recent Pulse Asia survey revealed that Cory rated highest with a trust rating of 41% beating Erap, FVR and GMA. The Time magazine put her again in its cover in its 2006 anniversary issue as the leading hero of Asia’s 60-year history beating Gandhi, Aung San Suu Kyi, MacArthur, Dalai Lama, Mother Teresa and many more heroes of our time. She was also honored by prestigious foreign award-giving institutions for her continuing efforts to empower poor communities in the socio-economic sphere in collaboration with various sectors of society.

Let us pray and light a candle of faith for Cory’s recovery from colon cancer.

Can GMA Run For Congresswoman?

2009-06-24T03:44:00.000-07:00

There is an ongoing debate as to whether President Gloria Arroyo would be considered as having forfeited her position should she run for congresswoman in Pampanga. Let me submit what I understood about this issue.

Before the passage of Fair Election Act (Republic Act No. 9006), any elective official including a President is deemed resigned from his office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy. The Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 67) provides :

Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. - Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

In the landmark case of Dimaporo vs. Mitra (G.R. No. 96859, 15 October 1991), the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of Speaker Mitras’ administrative act of erasing Ali Dimaporo name from the Roll of the House, pursuant to Sec. 67 of B.P. 881. The High Tribunal underscored the basic concept that a public office is a public trust - it is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

However, Sec. 67 of B.P. 881, was repealed by Sec. 14 of R.A. 9006 in 2001. The repealing clause provides :

Section 14. Repealing Clause. – Section 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bldg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.

R.A. 9006 was declared constitutional by no less than the Supreme Court in Farinas vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 152161, 10 December 2003). The SC said that Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws — the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress — is achieved.

Incidentally, Justice Cruz, argued that the repeal of Sec. 67 of B.P. 881 by Sec. 14 of R.A. 9006 is not valid for being a mere rider in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 26 (1) of the Constitution providing that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” The Fair Election Act deals only with political advertising, like TV commercials and election posters. It has nothing to do with forfeiture of original offices upon the filing of certificates of candidacy for different offices as provided for in Sec. 67.
In conclusion, based on the R.A. 9006 and Farinas ruling, GMA would not be deemed as having forfeited her position should she files her certificate of candidacy for congresswoman or any other positions lower than the Presidency for that matter.

It is however my fervent hope that someone has to challenge anew the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of Fair Election Act in the event GMA files her certificate of candidacy.

Bill of Attainder?

2008-09-26T22:09:00.000-07:00

Last week, the Provincial Board (PB) of Pampanga passed a resolution declaring running priest Fr. Robert Reyes as a “persona non grata” or an undesirable person. The PB’s action stemmed from the lambasting it received from Fr. Reyes for the former’s continuing opposition to Gov. Ed Panlilio’s governance.

A prominent lawyer-journalist in Pampanga described the resolution as a bill of attainder saying that such resolution has all the earmarks of a bill of attainder which are, (1) the unwanted characterization is a form of punishment; (2) The PB resolution was a legislative act; and (3) Fr. Reyes was neither invited nor given the opportunity to explain himself before the PB prior to making its “persona non grata” resolution.

I disagree.

One of the constitutive elements of a bill of attainder is that there must be a law enacted by a legislative body. Settled is the rule that a municipal resolution does not partake of the nature of a law. Said the Supreme Court in Municipality of Paranaque vs. VM Realty Corp., G.R. No. 127820, 20 July 1998)

We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

Absent the most essential element of a bill of attainder (i.e., there must be a law enacted by a legislative body), I submit the view the PB’s resolution on Fr. Reyes does not amount to a bill of attainder.

Can a gender be judicially changed?

2008-09-23T03:35:00.000-07:00

Can a petition for a change of sex (gender) be judicially granted on the basis of sex reassignment surgery (sex alteration)? In the case Silverio vs. Republic (G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007), the Supreme Court rejected the ruling of the Trial Court and pronounced to the effect that there is no law allowing the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment.

If an individual is an intersexual (hermaphrodite) or having both male and female reproductive organs, can a petition for a change of gender be judicially allowed on basis of his or her intersexuality? There is also no law allowing the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of intersexuality.

However, the Supreme Court, in the case of Republic vs. Cagandahan (GR No. 166676, 12 September 2008), affirmed the decision of RTC Laguna granting the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of Jennifer B. Cagandahan to change her name to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender to male. Jennifer was diagnosed of having a Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.

To quote the article in the Supreme Court, the High Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” It noted that Cagandahan “thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.” It stressed that Cagandahan has let nature take its course in her develoment to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

2008 Bar : Questions in Political Law

2008-09-10T02:46:00.000-07:00

Arguably, Political Law is said to be the waterloo of the bar examinees. Many did not pass the bar because they failed on this difficult bar subject. The 2008 bar questions in Political Law are already made available in the Supreme Court website. The Bar Exams Forum, of which I am an active member, has also posted the Political Law questions which are now being discussed and answered by the forum members.

The Political Law questions already answered by the members of Bar Exams Forum are found here. Mind you, these are only suggested answers. The authoritative answers are normally prepared by the Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS) and the UP College of Law.

Good luck, Barristers!

2008-09-07T02:01:00.000-07:00

The most difficult professional licensure examination in the world kicks off today where 6,533 law graduates are to take the 2008 Bar examinations for the four Sundays of September at the De La Salle University in Manila (DLSU). The 2008 bar examination is the 107th bar examination since the first bar exam held in 1901. The exam is exclusively administered by the Supreme Court of the Philippines through the Supreme Court Bar Examination Committee pursuant to Article VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution which provides that it shall have the power to promulgate rules governing the admission to the practice of law.

Last year’s bar exam, which produced good and interesting lawyers like Attys. Rax and Macka, is said to be one of the most difficult bar exams ever given by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had to adjust the passing grade to 70% and the disqualification rate in 3 subjects (civil, labor and criminal law) from 50 to 45% because only 5% of the 5,626 who took the 2007 tests (or less than 300) got the passing grade of 75%. The 2007 bar exam has also the distinction of having the lowest topnotcher grade, obtained by Mercedita L. Ona of ADMU (83.55%) which erased the prior record of 84.10% obtained by Adolfo Brillantes in 1920.

I wish all 2008 barristers good luck!

Time and money can derail the recall initiative vs. Among Ed

2008-09-06T03:15:00.000-07:00

As I write this Among Ed has safety reached Los Angeles for a series of speaking engagements before various Fil-Am organizations. He will also hold dialogue with the civil society groups foremost of which is PamagCUSA, a US-based organization that advances good citizenship through volunteerism.

Back home, the partisan news stories and editorials of Sun Star Pampanga depict that the recall initiative against Among Ed is already gaining ground. This perception is further bolstered by the moral support on the recall move given by a number of mostly controversial priests headed by an equally controversial monsignor, a son of my town Minalin who is believed to be close to the Pinedas of Lubao and Malacanang having had a hand in the appointment of one regional director in Central Luzon.

Let us not lose hope. The recall initiative will likely face formidable challenges along the way. Allow me to explain them.

1. Time Constraint

Per COMELEC Resolution No. 7505, no recall shall be held within one (1) year before the holding of the next regular election. What is the implication of this? This means the holding of a recall election is prohibited by law from 10 May 2009 until 10 May 2010, the date of the next regular election. In other words, the COMELEC has to set the recall election in Pampanga not later than 9 May 2009. After this date, no recall election is allowed by law.

Stated otherwise, Kambilan has only eight (8) months to complete the whole process of recall initiative which involves gathering of required signatures, filing of petition with the COMELEC, validating the sufficiency of the petition in form and substance and legal battles both in the COMELEC and the Supreme Court. This is a long and tedious process. Unless there’s “kingly” intervention, I don’t think the entire process of the recall initiative could be finished in a span of eight months.

2. Inadequate Budget

When top lawyer Romulo Macalintal downplayed the feasibility of a recall election due to lack of funds for that purpose, I did not believe him. Well, I believe him now after reading Republic Act No. 9498 also known as 2008 General Appropriations Act. In the COMELEC’s budget for fiscal year 2008, an amount of Php 46,894,000 is appropriated for the conduct and supervision of elections and other political exercises.

Out of that amount, only Php 5,000,000 is allocated for recall election that may be held. Incidentally, while Kambilan is yet to file a recall petition with the COMELEC there are about eighteen (18) recall petitions now pending in the COMELEC excluding the recall petition just recently filed against the governor of Sulu.

Given this situation, I do not think a recall election in Pampanga could push through. The COMELEC will have no funds to print ballots, conduct and supervise the election itself and pay the teachers that will man 6,461 precincts in Pampanga.

What happens if COMELEC officially declares that a recall election cannot be enforced because of insufficient or lack of funds? If there’s still time, I think the recall proponents would lobby Congress to pass a bill allocating a special funds for the conduct of a recall election in Pampanga. If this situation occurs, I do not think most of our senators, especially those seeking reelection, would support the measure for a simple reason that Among Ed is largely viewed as a political capital who can influence the political preference of the voters come election time.

I would like to ask a hypothetical question. What if the recall proponents volunteer to fund the recall election? Is there is a law allowing or prohibiting it. I don’t know. What I know is that a leading national newspaper branded the recall initiative as “shameless”. Going to the extent of funding the recall election by the proponents is not only brazen but downright unconscionable.

How ironic! The recall petition can prosper because of sufficient money being used by the proponents in the signature-gathering but the recall election itself cannot prosper because of the lack of it.

Note : Photo courtesy of PamagCUSA website

It's a shame!

2008-09-02T21:54:00.000-07:00

The picture above shows Governor Ed Panlilio taking a jeepney ride to the Capitol due to the depletion of his office's fuel allocation. He’s commuting to his office because the funds of his office have been depleted after it defrayed the operations of four offices under the office of the governor, budget of which was not approved by the Provincial Board (PB). This was exacerbated by the non-approval by the PB of the supplemental budget he requested last 21 April 2008.

It is quite obvious that the PB under the leadership of Vice Gov. Guaio is now trying to paralyze the operations of the governor and make him appear immobilize and useless. On the top of that, the initiatory phase of the recall petition appears to have gained ground already, a move publicly supported by Guiao and Provincial Board.

Why the forces of dirty politics want Among Ed ousted? The answer to this is editorialized by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, thus :

‘Nakakahiya’

Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:04:00 09/03/2008

That most of the local officials of Pampanga province, especially the mayors and board members, are suddenly beside themselves with their non-negotiable demand for credible and clean leadership is not at all surprising. But their brazenness is still breathtaking. Simply put, their “campaign” is both shameful and shameless. In Filipino, “nakakahiya, walang hiya!”

We are referring to the petition purportedly initiated by Kapanalig at Kambilan ning Memalen Pampanga (Kambilan) for the recall of Gov. Eddie “Among Ed” Panlilio.
The petition, pushed by these same officials, is not unexpected and has partisanship written all over it. It is public knowledge that some of Panlilio’s political adversaries, from the time of his election, do not want him to finish his term.

Right after his proclamation, they drove all over town waving their own version of the three R’s—recount, recall and requiem—like three swords of Damocles. Sure enough, a case for recount was filed shortly thereafter with the Commission on Elections by one of his rival candidates. (The Supreme Court forbade the recount while it deliberated on a related petition.) And the requiem? Panlilio himself has said that he has been told that a requiem (based on the Latin word for “rest,” and which in the Catholic Church’s lexicon refers to a Mass or service held especially for a deceased person) is being eyed by some of his enemies as a “last resort.”

Founded only last July, Kambilan can’t be the initiator of the recall drive; in fact, it can only be the front. This “non-profit and non-stock organization” is headed by the campaign manager of a losing candidate.

Candaba Mayor Jerry Pelayo’s statement that the Pampanga Mayors League will help gather the minimum 100,000 signatures needed for the recall petition gave Kambilan away: that is, it’s a skeleton that can’t come to life without the political networks of the very politicians unhappily watching Panlilio serve as Pampanga’s governor.

The recall petition is shameful and shameless because it is downright hypocritical. Pampanga today, despite being the home province of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, remains a “jueteng-free zone.” It remains, reportedly, the home base of the country’s most influential gambling lord. But Pampanga’s officials, except for Panlilio who is openly campaigning against this corrupting illegal numbers game, are not complaining. And they didn’t complain either when the province’s collection of lahar fees, prior to Panlilio’s term, was at unbelievable lows, amid talk that most of it was flowing into private pockets instead of provincial coffers. Neither did they care that the 2007 elections in Pampanga had been reduced, in the public mind, into a contest between jueteng interests and lahar money.

Disgusted and embarrassed by the prospect of having to vote “None of the Above,” conscientious Kapampangans looked for an alternative. They found a reluctant Father Panlilio who could not refuse because he had preached that the circumstances called for a strong moral stand for good governance, and they thought it was only he who had a fighting chance to win. The priest’s victory earned for the Kapampangans the nation’s admiration. It gave its people a new sense of pride, and Pampanga basked once again in a moment of glory. But most of all, it reassured all well-meaning Filipinos that there’s still hope for the country. Panlilio became the newest symbol of the Filipino people’s aspiration for a decent society.

Now that Panlilio has raised lahar collections from P2.41 million a month in 2006 to more than P17.57 million a month since June 2007, and insists on weeding out the underground lottery “jueteng,” Pampanga’s traditional politicians are scrambling to get him out. For a jumble of fuzzy reasons: loss of confidence in his leadership, gross negligence, perjury, failure to unify local officials, lack of clear directions and programs of actions, failure to deliver basic services, even non-attendance in meetings with the President. Well, the first time he went to such a meeting, he came home with a paper bag containing P500,000 and fell out of grace with Malacañang because he chose to tell the public about it.

The recall petition is not about good governance or transparency. It is about political opportunism and personal greed. At a time the Filipino nation is in desperate need of honest leaders, officials of the President’s province are doing everything to remove one. For shame.

The Price of Among Ed’s Recall

2008-09-02T01:41:00.000-07:00

A recall is a process which begins with the gathering of the signatures, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the date scheduled by the COMELEC.

History reveals that a recall election may take place within a short span of time or take longer than almost a year from the date of its initiation. In the case of Caloocan City Mayor Rey Malonzo, the recall election was held on 14 December 1996 or barely 5 months from the gathering of the required signatures. The recall of Mayor Jovito Claudio of Pasay City was initiated on 19 May 1999 and the recall election was held on 15 April 2000. On 2 July 2002, the people of Puerto Princesa City initiated the recall of Mayor Dennis Socrates and the COMELEC set the recall election on 14 August 2002.

I foresee that the recall of Among Ed would pass the same route as that of Mayor Claudio. It’s going to be a long protracted legal battle. Among Ed’s legal eagles would surely file opposition to the recall petition before the COMELEC citing Lilia Pineda’s pending election protest as a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the petition for recall could be given due course. The form and substance of the petition would also be expected to be questioned by his lawyers. Even if the COMELEC would eventually give due course to the recall petition, the legal battle does not end there. The Supreme Court would finally decide whether the recall election shall take place.

The whole recall process is a very expensive exercise. The proponents of the recall of Among Ed would spend millions to buy signatures and more millions to buy votes during the recall election. These exclude the enormous amounts to be spent on election campaign, PR and lawyer’s fee. Among Ed himself would not be spared from the burden of incurring cost involved in a recall. He would certainly need millions to get reelected.

It has been said that an initiative to recall an official is always resisted with stronger vim and venom. The reason is obvious. The incumbent would not like to lose power just recently won. The challenger, often a loser in the previous election, would not want to lose a second time. It foments divisive, wasteful and bloody politics where lives are often lost. Moreover, a recall election would undermine the delivery of basic services to the public. The running of the local government units would slow down as our elected officials would be preoccupied with the recall election campaign. This all augurs ill for the future of Pampanga.

This article is also posted in PamagCUSA website and Kasaup blog

Candle of Our Lives

2008-08-23T04:43:00.000-07:00

Brod is not thicker than water?

2008-08-21T00:48:00.000-07:00

Ninoy and Macoy were fraternity brothers. The bond of frat brotherhood and fraternal responsibility required them to love and help each other. This was however not true in the case of Ninoy and Macoy. There was a war of attrition between these two Upsilonians. Ninoy defied Marcos authoritarian rule and Macoy ordered Ninoy tried on false charges and incarcerated. Despite the enmity, Macoy admired and also cared for Ninoy.The Upsilonian in Marcos allowed Ninoy to undergo a heart bypass operation in the United States. Report has it that Macoy considered Ninoy as his best successor, best prepared for the presidency.

The martyred Ninoy owed his heroism to Macoy, his fraternity brother. Ninoy would not have become a hero if Macoy did not torment him. To a certain extent, Macoy made Ninoy a hero.

What's wrong with the word 'dedma'?

2008-08-11T23:59:00.000-07:00

At the first hearing on allegations of impropriety committed by some appellate court justices in their handling of a case involving Meralco, Justice Romeo Callejo berated Court of Appeals Justice Jose Sabio for using the word ‘dedma’ when he described how he felt when he saw Francis de Borja, whom he is accusing of attempting to bribe him with P10 million but who instead accused him of demanding P50 million.

“That is what is so tragic in this case, that justices, in the performance of their duties, use words such as ‘dedma'. “Forget the word dedma,” he said.

Why Justice Callejo was making a big fuss about a magistrate’s use of the word 'dedma' in conversational speech? Is ‘dedma’ a vulgar or bad word? I don’t think it is. Dedma is the attenuated form of the English words dead malice . Dead malice, in turn, is the literal translation of the Tagalog expression, patay malisya. It has been used in the following contexts.

1) To completely ignore/feign ignorance of the existence/presence of someone/something.
2) To snub, reject, or toss in the trash.
3) To pretend deafness or blindness in order to escape a sticky situation.

If the meaning word ‘dedma’ is not vulgar per se, why Callejo expressed disappointment over its usage? The obvious reason is that the word ‘dedma’ is a gay lingo. So what? The colloquial ‘dedma’ is understood in our day-to-day conversations and widely accepted as a familiar usage in informal speech. I do believe the correctness of a usage should not be judged by the social standing or prestige of the speakers who adopted it. Wide acceptance of a colloquial word should be the final arbiter of correctness. The speech of the intellectuals, the court, and the clergy is not the only standard that determines the correctness and propriety of a word. It's not unethical for our judges or justices to use colloquial words or expressions in informal conversations. I see no breach of Legal Ethics here.

The ‘Nardong Putik’ Law

2008-08-06T01:27:00.000-07:00

R.A. 8294 amended certain provisions of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) including the lowering of the penalties imposed on the illegal possession of firearms

R.A. 8294, now known as ‘The Revilla Law’, was purportedly crafted by Senator Ramon Revilla Sr. to benefit those incarcerated during the Marcos dictatorship for their political beliefs and whose imprisonment was brought about by the abusive execution of P.D. 1866. However, many believed that R.A. 8294 was enacted solely for the benefit of Robin Padilla, the solon’s family friend and an avid Ramos campaigner, who was then serving sentence for illegal possession of firearms.

Under R.A. 8294, the use of an unlicensed weapon is either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat. In brief, the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer be imposed because it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder or homicide and a qualifying circumstance in rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat.

What if an unlicensed weapon is used in the commission of ‘other crime’ other than homicide, murder, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’ etata? Stated otherwise, what happens when an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of ‘other crime’ like alarms and scandals, direct assault, grave threat, violation of gun ban or serious physical injuries? Section 1 of R.A. 8294 provides an answer to these questions, which reads in part :

The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

The above provisions suggest that the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the person arrested’. In other words, if the accused commits the ‘other crime’ (other than homicide, murder, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat) with the use of an unlicensed weapon, no separate charge for such use will be brought against him.

Now, does the mere filing of an information for ‘other crime’ against an accused necessarily preclude his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm? This was clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Celino, Sr. vs. CA (GR 170562, 29 June 2007), viz :

The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word “committed” taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.

In other words, if an accused is convicted of other crime - let say alarms and scandals - with the use of unlicensed firearm, which carries an imposable penalty of arresto menor, the prosecution of his case involving illegal possession of firearm should be discontinued. Ergo, the case of illegal possession of firearm, which carries a higher penalty than that of alarms and scandals, would become judicially irrelevant. How absurd! R.A. 8294 deserves a second look by our lawyers-legislators.

Interpreting a clear provision of law

2008-07-27T07:28:00.000-07:00

Verba legis or the “plain meaning rule” in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

There are, however, rare instances where the courts have interpreted statutes that leave no room for doubt and interpretation. One of such instances is the case of Lopez vs. COMELEC (GR No. 182701 dated 23 July 2008) where the Supreme Court interpreted the clear wordings of Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003), which states to the effect that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this law and seek elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.”

The above provision is crystal-clear. A dual citizen, as defined under R.A. No. 9225, is not qualified to run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she swears to a renunciation of his or her foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.

In the Lopez case, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC nullifying the election of Eusebio Eugenio Lopez, a Filipino-American (a dual citizen), who failed to renounce his American citizenship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay chairman in an Iloilo town in the last Barangay election held in October 2007. The High Court reiterated the requirement of Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 and further held that Lopez’s victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy.

Why a very clear, plain and literal provision of law had to be brought up to the Supreme Court for interpretation? Aren't lawyers supposed to know the plain meaning rule?

Calculating The Bar

2008-05-04T22:19:00.001-07:00

Yesterday I saw the Examiner’s Rating of a new lawyer whom I have always admired for his writing skill, humility and intelligence. He got a general weighted average of 75.55%. I sit back and got scared. I wondered in reticent why a person of such intellectual caliber got only a general weighted average of 75.55% in the bar exams. How could then I expect myself with less intelligence to pass the bar?

I looked again at the rating for each subject. He got a highest rating in Legal Ethics (95 and obtained a decent rating in Taxation (82) and Political and International (80). But he fared poorly in the other subjects ranging from 68 to 76. All in all the product he obtained was 1511, i.e., sum of all individual product per subject (rating per each subject multiply by corresponding relative weight). His general weighted average (75.55%) is the quotient of the product (1511) divided by the total relative weight (20).

Staring intently at the Examiner’s Rating, I made a mental interpolation on the ratings and ended up with an observation that a bar-taker could pass the bar exams if and when he would obtain a high rating in 2 or 3 subjects, particularly in a subject having a bigger relative weight namely Remedial Law, Political and International Law and Mercantile Law. I regained my courage and started calculating the bar ratings on the basis of this observation. Here’s what I got.

1. PIL (95), Legal Ethics (95), other subjects (70) = 75.00%

2. Civil (95), Legal Ethics (95), other subjects (70) = 75.00%

3. Remedial (83), PIL (86), other subjects (70) = 75.00%

4. PIL (88), Mercantile (86), other subjects (70) = 75.10%

5. Remedial (89), Legal Ethics (94), other subjects (70) = 75.00%

6. Criminal (90), Remedial (80), Legal Ethics (90), other subjects (70) = 75.00%

There are other variations depending upon one’s preferences. My favorite subject is Political Law and, modesty aside, I feel I’m quite strong in this subject. But proficiency in one subject alone is not enough. I need one more subject closer to my heart.

Are Barangay Kagawads and Lupong Tagapamayapa persons in authority?

2008-04-27T00:18:00.000-07:00

This article is also posted in View From The Ground

When I was a freshman in law, I was made to understand that among the barangay officials, only the Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain or Chairman) was expressly considered a person in authority in Art. 152 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads in part :

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; Who shall be deemed as such. — In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.(underscoring mine)

In my second year, however, I came to realize that my understanding above was not entirely correct based on my reading of Sec. 388 of the Local Government Code of 1991(R.A. No. 7160), which provides :

Section 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority. (underscoring supplied)

Sec. 388 of R.A. 7610 expands the import of a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code. In addition to the Punong Barangay provided in Art. 152 of the RPC, the Sangguniang Barangay members (Kagawads) and members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa are now considered as persons in authority. (People v. Felipe Sion, G. R. No. 109617, 11 August 1997)

What are the legal implications of Sec. 388 of R. A. 7160 in relation to some provisions of the Revised Penal Code? Let me cite some of them.

1. An offender may voluntarily surrender himself to a Barangay Kagawad or a member of Lupong Tagapamayapa. Such voluntary surrender is valid in accordance with Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. A felony committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due to a person in authority on account of his rank amounts to an aggravating circumstances pursuant to Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. In the crimes of Illegal Assemblies and Direct Assaults under Art. 146 and Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively, a member of Sangguniang Barangay or Lupong Tagapamayapa is within the contemplation of the phrase “person in authority”.

4. Any person who shall resist or seriously disobey a Sangguniang Barangay member or a member of Lupong Tagapamayapa while engaged in the performance of his official duties may be charged with violation of Art. 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

This is just an opinion of the author. Any views, concurring or dissenting, are most welcome here.

Is the Senate a Continuing Body?

2008-04-09T00:08:00.000-07:00

In Neri vs. Senate Committee, the issue of whether publication is necessary to the validity of the Senate rules turned on whether the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is a continuing body.

Is the Senate a continuing body under the 1987 Constitution?

The majority school of thought is that the present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body since the present Senate has 24 members, 12 of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of 12 Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress which requires a majority of Senators to constitute a quorum to do business. This point of view was posited by Justice Carpio in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in the Neri case, an opinion which, I believe, is shared by former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban as can be inferred from his article titled “Arroyo Supreme Court?” which I posted here before this.

On the other hand, the dissenting school of thought principally advanced by the respondent Senators in the Neri argued that the Senate is a continuing body. This argument is supported by no less than Chief Justice Reynato Puno in his Dissenting Opinion when he observed that “the Senators have traditionally considered the Senate as a continuing body despite the change of a part of its membership after an election. It is for this reason that the Senate does not cease its labor during the period of such election. Its various Committees continue their work as its officials and employees”.

It is interesting to note that the Senate has raised a new powerful argument in the Motion for Reconsideration filed on 8 April 2008 which reinforces its position that the Senate is a continuing body. The Senate put forward a new argument that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the Senate as a continuing body citing the exchange among the framers during the Constitutional Commission deliberations, to wit :

“MR. RODRIGO. x x x.

x x x .

We will have elections every three years under the scheme and we will have a continuing Senate. Every election, 12 of the 24 Senators will be elected, so that 12 Senators will remain in the Senate. In other words, we will have a continuing Senate.

x x x .

MR. DAVIDE

This is just a paragraph of that section that will follow what had earlier been approved. It reads : “Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest numbers of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years”.

This is to start the staggering of the Senate to conform to the idea of a continuing Senate.

Passing The Bar

2008-04-05T00:08:00.000-07:00

Just like my difficulty in finding an adjective for the taste of green mango with bagoong (shrimp paste), I could not think of a single English word that can best describe the feeling about passing the bar exams. Even the bar passers themselves cannot express in one word how the feeling like but they are in unison in saying that it’s a mixed feelings of relief and joy. Based on comments I read in several blawgs tackling the subject, it’s more than that. I would like to believe that such feeling is more intense than any other emotional perceptions. No, it’s not the feeling that’s told in the song “Top of the World”. It’s similar to a sublime feeling. I can feel that the feeling about passing the Bar is a poignant emotion of victory of faith and the spirit.

Second Opinion

2008-03-29T21:18:00.000-07:00

I have reproduced hereinbelow former Chief Justice Panganiban’s take on Neri vs. Senate Committees which I find mouthful and relevant.

With Due Respect
Arroyo Supreme Court?
By Artemio V. Panganiban
Philippine Daily Inquirer
Posted 03:12:00 03/30/2008

In the olden days, kings and queens ruled their domains absolutely according to their wiles and whims. They were not bound by pre-agreed rules to guide their actions. They simply imposed their wicked ways on the hapless people.

Constitutional democracy. As time went by, absolute rulers were deposed and new ones democratically selected. The chosen took the place of the kings but their powers were severely limited by constitutions and laws crafted by elected representatives. The rule of law prevailed when the chosen leader ran the country pursuant to the constitution and statutes, no longer by unpredictable wiles and whims.

In our country, the elected ruler who took the place of the king is the president. As in all constitutional democracies, not all the kingly powers are vested on the President. The authority to make laws is with Congress. The Supreme Court reviews executive acts to assure the reign of the rule of law. To further restrict the kingly prerogatives, the Constitution has created several other agencies like the Commission on Elections, the Commission on Audit, and the Ombudsman.

At present, President Macapagal-Arroyo, by her lonesome, commands the armed forces and the police. She spends more than 95 percent of the national budget, controls more than 95 percent of all national employees and supervises all provinces, cities, towns and barangays. Although the Supreme Court, Comelec, COA, and OMB are designed to be independent, the President appoints all their members.
Awesome powers. Indeed, the powers of the president are awesome. She could run the country by herself, without need of the Supreme Court, Congress, Comelec, etc., as ably demonstrated by Ferdinand Marcos. In fact, a repressive and corrupt president could use his or her prerogatives to subdue these agencies and thus enable him or her to rule the nation like the monarchs of old.

This is why the vitality of our democracy is dependent on the courage and competence of these agencies and their members to review and check presidential actions. This is also why there is unease, if not teeth-gnashing, when these agencies, especially the Supreme Court, unreasonably expand executive prerogatives, or inexplicably fail to check abuses.

“Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability,” promulgated last March 25, is a case in point. I have read the 35-page ponencia of Justice Teresita Leonardo de Castro plus the concurrences of Justices Renato C. Corona (21 pages), Dante O. Tinga (14 pages), Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. (nine pages), Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (15 pages) and Arturo D. Brion (nine pages), as well as the stirring dissents of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (120 pages), Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (seven pages), Antonio T. Carpio (36 pages), and Conchita Carpio Morales (31 pages).

With due respect, I believe that the majority decision failed to check presidential abuse; worse, it imprudently expanded executive privilege to cover wrongdoings.

First, to justify Secretary Romulo Neri’s refusal to answer the three questions linking President Arroyo to the ZTE-NBN mess, the majority considered “conversations that take place in the President’s performance of (her) official duties… presumptively privileged.” It deemed the bare, proof-less claim of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita that Neri’s disclosures “might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations” with China. It faulted the Senate with rank failure to explain a “critical or compelling need for the answers.”

By shifting the burden of proof to the Senate, the nine-member majority reversed the much-acclaimed “Senate vs Ermita,” issued just two years ago, that unanimously placed the duty of proving the need for secrecy on the president. Disclosure is the rule because the Constitution expressly mandates transparency and accountability for all officials.

Second, by giving the “presidential communications privilege” presumptive confidentiality, the majority inexplicably expanded kingly prerogatives. It unreasonably suppressed the truth.

Third, executive privilege is not expressly provided in the Constitution. There is no sentence or clause mentioning the privilege directly. The Supreme Court merely implied it from other presidential powers. In contrast, the power to investigate in aid of legislation is expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. In a clash between these two prerogatives, the choice is clearly in favor of the express grant.

Fourth, the majority agreed with the Senate that executive privilege should not be used to hide a crime or wrongdoing. Well and good. Yet, it still ruled against disclosure on the convoluted argument that “US vs Nixon” involved a “pending criminal action,” while the Neri petition related to a “legislative inquiry.” As I see it, this American case is simply inapplicable. The majority should have relied on the constitutional mandate requiring transparency and accountability of officials. Its decision would have been a great landmark.

An epochal Supreme Court is endearingly named after its chief, like the Davide Court or the Teehankee Court. However, when it unduly legitimizes kingly excesses, it is derisively named after the president it serves, like the Marcos Supreme Court. As a retired chief justice, I would like to believe that the Neri decision is a mere aberration and would not suffice to label the present tribunal as the Arroyo Supreme Court. But then, it must quickly choose what it wants to do. Is it to serve or to check President Arroyo?

2007 Bar Exams

2008-03-29T02:10:00.000-07:00

The agony of waiting is over. A total of 1,289 have passed the 2007 bar examinations out of 5,626 law graduates from 109 law schools. Under the Rules of Court, a bar examinee is deemed to have passed if he obtains a general average of 75 percent in all subjects without falling below 50 percent in any subject. The subjects and their corresponding weights are as follows: Remedial Law, 20 percent; Political and International Law, 15 percent; Mercantile Law, 15 percent; Civil Law, 15 percent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 percent; Taxation, 10 percent; Criminal Law, 10 percent; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 percent.

List of Bar Passers

1. ABALUS, Karen Anne M.
2. ABARDO-ESTRADA, Imee M.
3. ABARQUEZ, Carlo E.
4. ABDULLAH, Princess Shanihar A.
5. ABELLA, Johanna R.
6. ABISO, Meriame Joy D.
7. ABLOLA, Maricez J.
8. ABUNDABAR, Rhys Michael S.
9. ACEDILLO, Noelle T.
10. ACENA, Anna Cecilia D.
11. ACERET, Shantel P.
12. ACERO, Francis Euston R.
13. ACHARON, Paolo Jay S.
14. ACHAS, Anne Lourdes R.
15. ACLAN, Jennie C.
16. ACOSTA, JR., Isagani S.
17. ADIN, Fatima Irene T.
18. ADIOVA, Agnes Z.
19. ADLAO, Joyce P.
20. ADRIOSULA, Dino M.
21. AFRICA, Cecille Marie A.
22. AGAMATA, Abraham A.
23. AGDA, JR., Victoriano T.
24. AGONCILLO, Gildu R.
25. AGOR, Cesar A.
26. AGPAOA, Magnum D.
27. AGTARAP, Jeffrey M.
28. AGUAVIVA, Ma. Aileen G.
29. AGULAY, JR., Norberto S.
30. AGUNOS, Farah C.
31. AGUSTIN, Oliver P.
32. AGUSTIN, Ronesito B.
33. AKILITH, Joseph A.
34. ALADIN-VIDALLO, Rhia N.
35. ALAGABAN, Cherilee B.
36. ALAPOT, Jeofrey R.
37. ALAYON, Marivic M.
38. ALBAO, Ismael A.
39. ALBAYTAR, Mylene C.
40. ALCASABAS, Ramon Manolo A.
41. ALDOVINO, Farah A.
42. ALEJANDRE, Maria Zenaida F.
43. ALEJANDRO, Elsie A.
44. ALFONSO, Maria Kathrina C.
45. ALFONSO, Ramon M.
46. ALILING, Jose Percival Z.
47. ALIMA, Joel A.
48. ALINAO, Michael A.
49. ALINAS, Milber G.
50. ALINOG, Joanah C.
51. ALIPAO, Ligaya G.
52. ALIPUDDIN, Jamecia S.
53. ALIÑO, Dennis C.
54. ALMAZORA, Madelyn Joy S.
55. ALMEDA, John Voltaire A.
56. ALMODAL, Jezebel L.
57. ALOJADO, Rommero O.
58. ALONG, Angela Sigrid J.
59. ALONTE, Ruby Christine C.
60. ALONTO, II, Abdul Gaffur Madki M.
61. ALONZO, Angelita B.
62. ALTAMIA, Eden M.
63. ALVAERA, Joseph Vincent B.
64. ALVAREZ, Ethel L.
65. ALVAREZ, Katrina Anne F.
66. ALVAREZ, Mercedes K.
67. ALVIAR, Myrvilen L.
68. AMADA, Aileen E.
69. AMATONG, Aldren Raye A.
70. AMBATALI, Marian Kristine V.
71. AMOLATA, Apple Cherrie S.
72. AMPARO, Maria Lourdes G.
73. AMPON, Dennis R.
74. ANARNA, Jinky Y.
75. ANCHETA, Ari N.
76. ANDAYOG, Michael S.
77. ANG, Alli T.
78. ANGEL, Joseph Angelo D.
79. ANGELES, Anna Asuncion P.
80. ANGELES, Ela DV.
81. ANGUSTIA, Joseph Domingo M.
82. ANICETE, Alexander Philip C.
83. ANILLO-JACINTO, Ma. Cristina P.
84. ANONGOS, Juliana N.
85. ANTONANO, Essy Genebelle B.
86. ANTONIO, Dan David Vincent D.
87. ANTONIO, Giovanni J.
88. ANTONIO, Michelle M.
89. ANTONIO, Rowena A.
90. APOLINARIO, Anissa P.
91. APOLINARIO, Odilon A.
92. APOLONIO, Katherine G.
93. APOLONIO, III, Alfonso A.
94. APOSTOL, JR., Manolito M.
95. APRUEBO, Violet M.
96. AQUINO, Aristotle R.
97. AQUINO, Loly C.
98. AQUINO, Ma. Carina A.
99. AQUINO, Mary Ann Gretchen U.
100. AQUINO, Noe T.
101. AQUINO-BUÑO, Mimi L.
102. ARBUES, Christian M.
103. ARCEGA, Cesar Arnel M.
104. ARCENAS, Ernie B.
105. ARCHIVAL, Al John M.
106. ARCOS, Dante L.
107. ARDAÑA, Benju V.
108. ARENAS, Maria Diana S.
109. AREVALO, Edgard A.
110. ARIMBOYUTAN, JR., William D.
111. ARIOLA, Rendey D.
112. ARITAO, Benjamin Lawrence P E.
113. ARRIOLA, Roy J.
114. ARSITIO, Robin R.
115. ARUGAY, Roman C.
116. ASCALON, Maki-angel O.
117. ASENCIO, Valentina J.
118. ASENCION, Lincoln R.
119. ASERIT, Ma. Girlie B.
120. ASETRE, Ivy V.
121. ASINAS, Neilster Jon S.
122. ASPA, Franz Raymond P.
123. ASTIH, Pakhruddin M.
124. AURELLANA, Rinchel E.
125. AUSTRIA, Norman B.
126. AVANCE, Candy T.
127. AYSON, JR., Ruben S.
128. BACAL, Noel G.
129. BACALLA, Noel O.
130. BACELONIA, Joy Anne V.
131. BACONGA, Saturnino N.
132. BACORRO, Lianne M.
133. BADIOLA, Alan V.
134. BAGALOYOS, Anne Jamaica E.
135. BAGUIO, Mario P.
136. BAJA, Mariel D.
137. BAKINO, Suseyline M.
138. BALA, Jerwin D.
139. BALANAY, Ruena D.
140. BALAO-AS, John B.
141. BALAOING, Emman B.
142. BALBA, Jennifer M.
143. BALBANERO, Michael A.
144. BALDO, Ma. Aimee E.
145. BALDONADO, Neil Energyte G.
146. BALDOS, Catherine A.
147. BALEIN, Mignonette Emelaine Gail D.
148. BALO, Ted Andrew M.
149. BALOT, Dexter M.
150. BALTAO, Kimberly May F.
151. BALUYOT, Rosario R.
152. BAMBO, Ulysses G.
153. BANAUAG, Boris Maria T.
154. BANAWA, Frayn M.
155. BANAYBANAY, Clarissa Idris G.
156. BANTILAN, JR., Paterno T.
157. BAQUILOD, Clara A.
158. BARCELLANO, JR., Julio D.
159. BARRIOS, Karla Maria F.
160. BARRIOS, Manuel Isidro Rosauro V.
161. BARROSO, Rachel Rueve Marie T.
162. BARSAGA, JR., Nilo P.
163. BARTOLOME, Sheryl G.
164. BARUT, Maribel L.
165. BASALLAJE, Eva Bernardette V.
166. BASAS, Joseph Melvin B.
167. BASCO, Neil Sam L.
168. BASCO, Reynante B.
169. BASQUIÑEZ, Flora Sherry M.
170. BASTASA, Michellee C.
171. BATAY, Rosalyn D.
172. BATICULON, Blanchie T.
173. BATOCAEL-DOMINGO, Faye T.
174. BAUTISTA, Antonio Carlos B.
175. BAUTISTA, Irvin A.
176. BAUTISTA, Jackie Lou C.
177. BAUTISTA, Maria Teresa I.
178. BAUTISTA, Patricia Lee Alexandra M.
179. BAYLON, Melvin P.
180. BAYOT, Rocherrie S.
181. BEJER, Louise Dianne A.
182. BEJOC-CARANDANG, Florence G.
183. BELORIA, JR., Cesar B.
184. BELTRAN, Leonard M.
185. BELZA, Mary Angieline L.
186. BEN, Noel A.
187. BENITEZ, Ferdinand S.
188. BENITEZ, Victor Esteban S.
189. BENTULAN, Jeremias A.
190. BERMUDEZ, Ronaldo O.
191. BERNADES, Dexter Niño E.
192. BERNADOS, Cresente C.
193. BERNAL, June Ann Q.
194. BERNAL, Rj A.
195. BERNAL, Victor Marc B.
196. BERNARDO, Rommel M.
197. BILLONES-IBARDOLAZA, Maria Genalyn T.
198. BILOCURA, Nathaniel B.
199. BINALAY, Maria Florinia B.
200. BINAYAN, Darcy M.
201. BITARA, Francis Rael C.
202. BLANCO, Mark Philip B.
203. BLANQUISCO, Sherryl R.
204. BLANZA, Randy B.
205. BOADO, Armi-lynn Kristine H.
206. BOCAR, Vida Zora G.
207. BOCO, Jimmy B.
208. BOJOS, Anna Fionah L.
209. BOLIVAR, Amy Grace O.
210. BOLIVAR-AMONCIO, Anna Marie Josette A.
211. BOLLIDO, Ma. Corazon P.
212. BOMBASE, Paulo N.
213. BONGAT, Joanna S.
214. BONIFACIO, Marie Eugenie Grace M.
215. BONSOL, Mary Grace S.
216. BONTIGAO-BAGUE, Maria Estela H.
217. BORBON, Alyssa Benetta L.
218. BORGONIA, John Ismael B.
219. BORJA, Karl Frederick S.
220. BORJA, Ruel P.
221. BOTIGAN, Maria Cristina C.
222. BRAGADO, Marijoy B.
223. BRAGAS, Diane Karen B.
224. BRILLANTES, Love Joy Cecilia C.
225. BRIONES, Joyce M.
226. BRIONES, Leo Santiago M.
227. BRITANICO, Francesco C.
228. BRITO, Edita
229. BUENAVISTA, Ryan S.
230. BUENCAMINO, Christine Marie V.
231. BUENDIA, Terence P.
232. BUENVIAJE, Ernest Ian S.
233. BUGAYONG, Allan Rheynier D.
234. BULATAO, Sheryl Grace G.
235. BULONG, JR., Joaquin N.
236. BULSECO, Cheslyn Claire C.
237. BULSECO, III, Francisco S.
238. BURGOS, Jo Ann M.
239. BUSLAYAN, JR., Romeo F.
240. BUSTOS, Janina Lourdes S.
241. BUZETA-ACERO, Andre Ria B.
242. CABAILO-ALDEA, Ethelwolda A.
243. CABALHUG, JR., Antonio J.
244. CABANLAS, Dick Carlo J.
245. CABANTOG, Amylaine R.
246. CABARABAN, Maria Cielo Shanidar C.
247. CABEL, Karla T.
248. CABILES, Jo Aileen A.
249. CABRAL, III, Ricardo Felix C.
250. CABUHAT, Mary Ellen S.
251. CACABELOS, Karren Maricris G.
252. CACERES, Rowena C.
253. CADIZ, Manuel Cesar Reno S.
254. CALAYAN, Deanna Maria Rachel S.
255. CALINGIN, Carlomagno N.
256. CALIPES, Bhavelyn S.
257. CALIZO, Brian M.
258. CALLANTA, Eduardo G.
259. CALSEÑA, Mariedith B.
260. CALSIYAO, JR., Ceferino B.
261. CALUMBA, Edelene Grace S.
262. CAMANGEG, Cristel Marie G.
263. CAMELON, III, Renato M.
264. CAMORA, Gloria A.
265. CAMPOS, JR., Napoleon P.
266. CAMPOSANO, Catherine A.
267. CAMUA, Roger Terence P.
268. CANCEKO, Eileen Joy P.
269. CANONIGO-GAN, Catherine C.
270. CANSINO, III, Emilio P.
271. CANTAROS, JR., Rufino C.
272. CANULLAS, Karen S.
273. CAOAYAN, Wenceslao R.
274. CAPACITE-BALLAIS, Gissle Gay A.
275. CARANTES, John Carlo E.
276. CARIÑO, Maria Elena E.
277. CARLOTA, JR., Mariano P.
278. CARPINA, Iris M.
279. CARPIO, Benedicto R.
280. CARREON, III, Cesar R.
281. CARTAGENA, Benedict S.
282. CARUNGCONG, Jonathan R.
283. CASABAR, Alezandro S.
284. CASANGKAPAN, Antonio C.
285. CASEÑAS, Ma. Goretti V.
286. CASIMIRO, Orlando Paolo F.
287. CASTAÑEDA, Kristina P.
288. CASTAÑOS, Chester C.
289. CASTIGADOR, Alex C.
290. CASTILLO, Eilyn Beverly Bless L.
291. CASTILLO, Jocelyn Perolina
292. CASTILLO, Marlon William M.
293. CASTILLO-LORENZO, Cesaria Dane D.
294. CASTRO, Fernand A.
295. CASTRO, Jesselito L.
296. CASTRO, Rainela D.
297. CAUDANG, Hashreen T.
298. CAVADA, Glenn M.
299. CAVISTANY, Debbie Liezl B.
300. CAYABYAB, Pamela Ann T.
301. CAYBOT, Cristina V.
302. CAÑAS, Reginildo R.
303. CELINO, Sarah Eufrosina D.
304. CENABRE, Ethan Allen F.
305. CEQUENA, Levie Lyn C.
306. CERILLO, Maria Theresa A.
307. CERVANTES, Paul Christian M.
308. CERVANTES-CABALATUNGAN, Milajoy D.
309. CHAN, Jordanne B.
310. CHAVEZ, Marvin Gregory R.
311. CHAVEZ, III, Cesar Angelo A.
312. CHENG, Charles Edward M.
313. CHING, Ronald Segundino C.
314. CHING, III, Benito S.
315. CHIONG, Naomi C.
316. CHIU, Karol Joseph P.
317. CHU, Emilio C.
318. CLAMOR, Antonette P.
319. CLARA, Barbra Jill B.
320. CLARAVALL, VI, Francisco M.
321. CO, Evangeline M.
322. CO, Karl Steven A.
323. CO, Rosalyn S.
324. CO, Ryan D.
325. CODA-MAMUKID, Monalisa B.
326. COLET, Juan Paolo E.
327. COLICO, Cristina T.
328. COMPETENTE, Joenel R.
329. CONALES, Christie Anne S.
330. CONCEPCION-MORAN, Juliana G.
331. CONCHA, Diana Charlette G.
332. CONCHA, Susan Espera L.
333. CONCHA, Val Angelo C.
334. CONSTANTINO, Pillar L.
335. COPAHAN, Levie U.
336. CORCEGA, Mediner M.
337. CORDERO, Felicito C.
338. CORDIA, Marthe Lois V.
339. CORONEL, Anna Karina A.
340. CORONEL, Jeffrey Jefferson Y.
341. CORPUZ, Emmanuel Rico C.
342. CORRAL, Claire B.
343. CORRO, Andrew C.
344. CORTES, Lee Owen P.
345. CORTEZ, Vida A.
346. CORTEZANO, Marwin M.
347. COSTALES, Leslie D.
348. CRISOSTOMO, Jeremiah N.
349. CRISTOBAL, Laurrie Layne P.
350. CRUZ, Anna Liza R.
351. CRUZ, Celeste Marie R.
352. CRUZ, Consuelo L.
353. CRUZ, Din-din A.
354. CRUZ, Elbert S.
355. CRUZ, Francis Joseph A.
356. CRUZ, Guia Perpetua C.
357. CRUZ, Jaymark SJ.
358. CRUZ-ABRENICA, Ma. Sophia Editha C.
359. CU, Robespierre S.
360. CUADRAS, Christian Arfel B.
361. CUBERO, Ela Michelle S.
362. CUDAL, Efren S.
363. CUNANAN, Rowena S.
364. CUPIDA, Febie A.
365. CURA, Amando M.
366. CURAMENG, Mary Ann T.
367. CURVA, Peter Marcu G.
368. DADULLA, Marites D.
369. DAGANTA, Shirley R.
370. DALIVA, Kristina Marie D.
371. DAMASCO, Alvy B.
372. DAMONDAMON, Mark Michael G.
373. DANCEL, Rojie G.
374. DAOAS, Pio Windale A.
375. DAPANAS, Lex Michelle M.
376. DAPON, JR., Loreto J.
377. DAPUL, Rhodalyne E.
378. DASING, Perlita DP.
379. DATUDACULA, Jamil D.
380. DATUDACULA, Normina M.
381. DAUZ, Roselea M.
382. DAVID, J. Krisley C.
383. DAYANDAYAN, Milreysa S.
384. DAYANDAYAN, JR., Remegio C.
385. DAYRIT, Chelin Y.
386. DAYRIT, Decruso P.
387. DE ANGEL, Jerlyn D.
388. DE AUSTRIA, Blisselda G.
389. DE CLARO, Christine Joanne F.
390. DE GUIA, Anne Mhiren Claudine D.
391. DE GUZMAN, Carmela Joy R.
392. DE GUZMAN, Ederlita V.
393. DE GUZMAN, Jay B.
394. DE GUZMAN, Soraida A.
395. DE GUZMAN, Vera M.
396. DE GUZMAN, JR., Glenn Ceasar T.
397. DE JESUS, Precy C.
398. DE JESUS, Remedios V.
399. DE JESUS, Roman Miguel G.
400. DE LA PAZ, Luis Gregorio Jesus B.
401. DE LA TORRE, Mailene M.
402. DE LARA, Elizabeth Alexandra Mary A.
403. DE LEON, Alaya M.
404. DE LEON, Dennis Carlos Rogaciano C.
405. DE LEON, Dino Robert L.
406. DE LEON, John Paul V.
407. DE LEON, Katrina P.
408. DE LEON, Pantas M.
409. DE LOS REYES, Kristine Margaret R.
410. DE LOS REYES, Teodula B.
411. DE LOS SANTOS, Mary Grace G.
412. DE QUIROZ, Napoleon C.
413. DE VERA, Celeste A.
414. DE VERA, Marichelle DT.
415. DEE, Ma. Gemma M.
416. DEGAMO, Wilhelmo M.
417. DEGOLLADO, Ethel Marie G.
418. DEL CASTILLO, Anna Patricia R.
419. DEL ROSARIO, Aldrich C.
420. DEL ROSARIO, Julie Fe A.
421. DEL ROSARIO, Rowena A.
422. DELA CERNA, Orville T.
423. DELA CRUZ, Joan M.
424. DELA CRUZ, JR., Anastacio R.
425. DELA CRUZ, JR., Epifanio C.
426. DELA FUENTE, Abigail R.
427. DELA FUENTE, Juan Miguel Victor C.
428. DELA PAZ, Ronald Ray O.
429. DELA PEÑA, Jonalyn D.
430. DELA ROSA, Abigail R.
431. DELAMIDE, Adan T.
432. DELGADO, Wilma H.
433. DELGADO, JR., Enrico B.
434. DELIMA, Ma. Chat H.
435. DELLOSO, Prince Gil F.
436. DELORIA, Kim E.
437. DELOS SANTOS, Josefina Maria Procesa L.
438. DEPASUCAT, Reyna Faith B.
439. DEQUILLA, Christopher L.
440. DERLA, Brenda Y.
441. DESAMPARADO, Ma. Johanna P.
442. DESCALZO, Jose Ariel M.
443. DETICIO, Aileen Grace U.
444. DEVANADERA, Anna Noreen T.
445. DEYTO, Melinda D.
446. DIAZ, Noriel D.
447. DIAZ, Rei Alessandro L.
448. DIMACALI, Adrian P.
449. DIMAILIG, Maricris T.
450. DIMALIG, Ma. Wengel Lou S.
451. DINAMLING, Dick Mark D.
452. DINGAL, Ailene L.
453. DIONALDO, Junald S.
454. DIOSO, Armand B.
455. DIRIGE, Chelsea Segunda G.
456. DIVINAGRACIA, Lenore Angeline L.
457. DIVINAGRACIA, Mae S.
458. DIVINO, Reichelle S.
459. DOMANTAY, Valerie Grace F.
460. DOMINGO, Andrix D.
461. DOMINGO, Osana Theresa D.
462. DOMINGO, Sherwin E.
463. DOMINGO, Tristan Dwight P.
464. DOMINGUEZ, Lovely P.
465. DONASCO, Edgar Alan A.
466. DORADO, Rilt Renart G.
467. DORIA, Marites Q.
468. DORIA, Richard Joseph C.
469. DOROMAL, Jose Joel P.
470. DUMAMA, Sha Elijah B.
471. DUMBAB, Harvey A.
472. DUMLAO, Jovian Jubert S.
473. DUMLAO, Melchor B.
474. DUMPILO, Eric Anthony A.
475. DUQUE, Gonzalito Nicolo E.
476. DURA, Blair M.
477. DY, Kristina Irene C.
478. DYBONGCO, Levi N.
479. DYCHIAO, Lorraine N.
480. EBILLO, Russel L.
481. ECHIVERRI, Juan Crisostomo M.
482. ECLAR, Clarence M.
483. EDDING, Jihan El R.
484. EDILLOR, Kathleen T.
485. EJES, Reynaldo R.
486. ELERIA, Elmer D.
487. ELIZALDE, Peter Bill C.
488. ELOPRE, Rojane C.
489. ELVEÑA, Christine Angelica B.
490. EMPINO, Arolf C.
491. ENTICA, Mellany V.
492. ERALDO-ARNUCO, Marcia Monina L.
493. ERNIE, Rachelle DG.
494. ESCUETA, III, Emilio D.
495. ESPAÑO, Mary Trish R.
496. ESPAÑOL, Diosdado C.
497. ESPAÑOL, Fritzzie Lyn F.
498. ESPEJO, Dhylyne Enchon B.
499. ESPERA, Woody John G.
500. ESPINOSA, Benjie G.
501. ESPINOSA, Maria Karla L.
502. ESPIRITU, Roel S.
503. ESTARES, Erwin P.
504. ESTAÑO, Heinjie B.
505. ESTILO, Chatru Anthony C.
506. ESTIMADA, Eric O.
507. EUGENIO, Christopher G.
508. EVANGELISTA, Ignacio F.
509. EVANGELISTA, Maria Ghia C.
510. EVANGELISTA, Ronald Brian G.
511. EXAMEN, Hannah D.
512. EXCONDE, Caroline G.
513. FABELLA, Caryl Kate S.
514. FABI, Joycery V.
515. FABILA, Eni Grace B.
516. FAJARDO, Ann Laurice A.
517. FAJARDO, Marlon G.
518. FAJARDO, Ria Divina I.
519. FALCULAN-MARI, Ma. Rowena D.
520. FAMA, Castelo Angelo T.
521. FANLO, Jaime Eduardo R.
522. FANLO, Mei Loraine C.
523. FANTONE, Ronald A.
524. FERNANDEZ, Francis A.
525. FERNANDEZ, Joselito D.
526. FERNANDEZ, Rommel P.
527. FERNANDEZ, Teodoro Lorenzo A.
528. FERNANDO, Janina Marie S.
529. FERRARIS, Wilt P.
530. FERRER, Dennis B.
531. FESALBON, Brenda Rhea F.
532. FESTEJO, Ryan Ed T.
533. FIANZA, Jinky Joar D.
534. FIDEL, Cyril C.
535. FIEL, Jasmin R.
536. FIGUEROA, Eddalaine M.
537. FLORA, Vanessa B.
538. FLORES, Arthur C.
539. FLORES, Chuchie L.
540. FLORES, Galerie Gee Y.
541. FLORES, Milette Socorro S.
542. FLORES, Sim C.
543. FLORES, Zargibran Adolben R.
544. FLORESE, Jose Frederick P.
545. FONTILLAS, Hyacinth T.
546. FORAYO, Christina P.
547. FORTUNO, Loretta Renie R.
548. FRANCISCO, Carlos Raphael N.
549. FRANCISCO, Kristine C.
550. FRANCO, Fatima Kristine J.
551. FUA, Marforth T.
552. GABALLO, Joyce B.
553. GABRIEL, Abegail C.
554. GABRIELES, Omar T.
555. GACUTNO, Jerry V.
556. GADRINAB, Fermin Nestor A.
557. GADUANG-ROJALES, Anita A.
558. GALA, Ana Siela M.
559. GALAURAN, John Michael S.
560. GALAY, Lani S.
561. GALLEROS, Cecille P.
562. GAMALINDA, Cheryl S.
563. GAMBONG, Lilyn D.
564. GAMONNAC, Florendo D.
565. GAN, Paula Katherina A.
566. GAN, III, Joaquin N.
567. GANALON, John Paul R.
568. GAPOL, JR., Flaviano T.
569. GAPOY, Lei Adrian V.
570. GARCES, Michael M.
571. GARCIA, Czarina B.
572. GARCIA, Jorge M.
573. GARCIA, Katherine Mari S.
574. GARGARITA, Claire Anne R.
575. GARIANDO, Ivy P.
576. GARINGARAO, May C.
577. GARLITOS, Kenneth Vincent J.
578. GARRIDO, Maria Cecilia M.
579. GATCHALIAN, Michal L.
580. GAYETA-ANDAYA, Catherine Joy S.
581. GAYON, Dorothy L.
582. GAYOSA, Tracy Ann M.
583. GEMENTIZA, Frederick A.
584. GENETIANO, Maureen R.
585. GENISE, Henida G.
586. GERADA, Jay P.
587. GERODIAS, Jillina M.
588. GERONA, Christian D.
589. GERONILLA, Beatriz O.
590. GERONIMO, Cesar C.
591. GERVASIO, Lianne Marie R.
592. GO, Aaron D.
593. GO, Angel Love M.
594. GO, Helene D.
595. GO, James G.
596. GO, Kirby C.
597. GO, Madonna Santa D.
598. GO, Maria Leonita Q.
599. GO, JR., Lito A.
600. GOC-ONG, Vanessa B.
601. GODINEZ, Christopher Lyndon N.
602. GOLLABA, JR., Gabriel L.
603. GOMEZ, Armeen Alain B.
604. GONZAGA, Johans S.
605. GONZAGA, Rosanne Juliana R.
606. GONZALES, Gerald S.
607. GONZALES, Sheryl V.
608. GONZALES, II, Marcelino R.
609. GRAGASIN, Manny V.
610. GRAN, Adriel B.
611. GRANDE, Alexander Francis C.
612. GUANZON, Woodro L.
613. GUARINO-RIVERA, Leila Magda N.
614. GUERRA, Ed Anthony F.
615. GUERRA, Reah B.
616. GUERRA-DE LA VEGA, Anna Marie Mae R.
617. GUICO, Maria Laarni Sheila S.
618. GUILING, Hosni L.
619. GUILLERMO, Virgin Rose Sharon P.
620. GUIMBATAN, Sandra M.
621. GUINA, Rene Andrew A.
622. GUIPO, Maria Primarisa C.
623. GUMPAL, Dante Gil D.
624. GUTIERREZ, Andrea L.
625. GUZMAN, Jacqueline A.
626. GUZMAN, Josefina A.
627. HAMCHAWAN, Judith B.
628. HERMOSISIMA, Honorato Carlo C.
629. HERNANDEZ, Cheryl A.
630. HERNANDEZ, JR., Celso J.
631. HERNANDO, Cherry Chiara L.
632. HERRERA, Georgia May L.
633. HIZON, Joaquin Miguel Z.
634. HORCA, III, Jesus Manuel A.
635. HORTIZ, Michelle L.
636. HUBAHIB, Mariano C.
637. HUMILDE, Philip N.
638. HURTADO, Ghia Chrystellyne O.
639. IBRAHIM, Ysnaira A.
640. ILAGAN, JR., Casiano A.
641. ILAO, Julan C.
642. ILARDE, Maila Katrina Y.
643. IMPERIAL, Dinah F.
644. IMPERIAL, Paul Rodulfo B.
645. INDAR, Rahma A.
646. INOTURAN, Florinda P.
647. INTERIOR, Enrico S.
648. JABAL, Joel J.
649. JABSON, Eugene Oliver M.
650. JACOB, Jamael A.
651. JACOBO-GRECIA, Nemia S.
652. JANDUSAY, Marie Bernadette M.
653. JAPZON, Maria Jeanette A.
654. JARANILLA, Cedric S.
655. JATICO-NUÑEZ, Janeth G.
656. JAUD, Myra Jennifer D.
657. JAUDINES, Sheryl C.
658. JAVIER, Z 19 S.
659. JOVEN, Emil Karlo L.
660. JUMALON, Joel Jonn U.
661. JURIAL, Niño Jim B.
662. JUSTINIANI, JR., Romeo S.
663. KANAPI, Roberto Ricardo O.
664. KUONG, Dennis C.
665. LABIAL, JR., Ricardo P.
666. LABOG, Norberto Pocholo P.
667. LABRADOR, Chaveli Joan O.
668. LABUSTRO-GARCIA, Jacquelyn A.
669. LACAMBRA, JR., Modesto C.
670. LAGAT, Eileen Mae B.
671. LAGMAN, Mary Rosary D.
672. LAGMAY, Aries John P.
673. LAIZ-DE VILLA, Ma. Theresa S.
674. LAM, Jennifer T.
675. LAMA, Michelle T.
676. LAMIGO, Richard L.
677. LAMPA, Rex D.
678. LANTION, Maria Camille G.
679. LAO, Dave Y.
680. LAO, Jewelle Y.
681. LAPPAY, JR., Gregorio A.
682. LAPUZ, Rosalie T.
683. LASAFIN, II, Adler Mari Eriberto L.
684. LASCANO, Jasper Alberto H.
685. LASTIMADO, Marvin P.
686. LAURE, Adonis A.
687. LAURE, Quijano S.
688. LAUREL, Marivic DL.
689. LAYUMAS-CELESTE, Edelyn A.
690. LEAGOGO, Adrianne Daniel L.
691. LEGARTO, Mary Ann C.
692. LEGASPI, Faith Henriet B.
693. LEONARDO, Melissa N.
694. LEPAIL, Jehan-jehan A.
695. LERO, John Paul Huey V.
696. LEYSON, Ian Peter A.
697. LIBARDO, Arlene Mae L.
698. LIBRADO, Leah A.
699. LIBUIT, Grace P.
700. LIDASAN, Jehan B.
701. LILAGAN, Jean P.
702. LIM, Anthony Lemuel T.
703. LIM, Antonio Paolo S.
704. LIM, Beatriz Paz Dominique D.
705. LIM, Dominadoranne I.
706. LIM, Edward Allan P.
707. LIM, Eileen D.
708. LIM, Frederick Charles Y.
709. LIM, Irene C.
710. LIM, Joanne M.
711. LIM, Lloyd Steven L.
712. LIM, JR., Menandro T.
713. LIMA, Cherry Joie B.
714. LIMBO, Charo C.
715. LINSANGAN, Jose A.
716. LIWAG, Monica T.
717. LIWALUG, Fatimah S.
718. LIZA-TORRES, Connie P.
719. LLARENA, Geoffrey H.
720. LLAVE, Lynda
721. LLAVE, Maria Isabel M.
722. LLENARES, Kathleen E.
723. LLIDO, Christian B.
724. LLOBRERA, Santy B.
725. LOAYON, Wildebrandt C.
726. LOBEDICA, Clyde Lelith S.
727. LOBERIO, Jonathan D.
728. LOBIANO, Maria Lourdes M.
729. LOBO, Numer P.
730. LOMAS-E, JR., Bonifacio Craig Y.
731. LONGALONG, Carol P.
732. LONTOC, Maureen DR.
733. LOPEZ, Erwin N.
734. LOPEZ, Gloria Monica S.
735. LOPEZ, Grace Marie
736. LOPEZ, Irish T.
737. LOPEZ, Jose Manuel A.
738. LOPEZ, Lea Mabel P.
739. LOPEZ, Lionel L.
740. LOPEZ, Maria Aurora Celestina M.
741. LOPEZ-BILAOEN, Nancy R.
742. LOPINGCO, Sharina Marie U.
743. LORENZANA, Gina L.
744. LORENZO, Jason T.
745. LU, Anna Victoria M.
746. LU, Sheila U.
747. LUI, Jonah Grace L.
748. LUMAGUI-SAYOTO, Marinela D.
749. LUMBATAN, Alexis M.
750. LUNA, Don Angelo S.
751. LUNA, Sandra A.
752. LUY, Ruby M.
753. MAALAT, Yvanna DL.
754. MAATA, Michael Oliver B.
755. MABANAG, Zeus R.
756. MABANGLO, Mildred Ann Q.
757. MABANSAG, Ivy B.
758. MABAZZA, Cristina A.
759. MABUTAS, Jesus Servando S.
760. MACAPAGAL, Richelle Joy P.
761. MACARAIG, Allan Reiz C.
762. MACARILAY, Florante C.
763. MADAMBA, Marvelous M.
764. MADAYAG, Irene Mae R.
765. MADULID, Lea T.
766. MAESTRADO-APARICIO, Jona T.
767. MAGBANUA, Pearl Sheila S.
768. MAGBANUA, JR., Manuel M.
769. MAGCAWAS, Allison T.
770. MAGNO-ZARATE, Citedina U.
771. MAGPANTAY, Anthea A.
772. MAGPANTAY-NG, Maricel M.
773. MAGRACIA, Herschel F.
774. MAGSINO, Carmi D.
775. MAGUAD, Zha-zha R.
776. MAHAMUD, John-christopher T.
777. MAILOM, Renniel C.
778. MALASA, Angelica O.
779. MALIAWAO, Anwar Khalid U.
780. MALLARI, II, Roberto P.
781. MANALABE, Grandis Rem T.
782. MANALANG, Kristina C.
783. MANALO, Jose Miguel S.
784. MANALO, Juan C.
785. MANANSALA, Edwin C.
786. MANCAO, Cecille B.
787. MANINGDING, Cadeiah B.
788. MANIS, Teliano L.
789. MANLOSA, Armi Lyn B.
790. MANLUYANG, Jeoffrey C.
791. MANUEL, Harlynne Monette M.
792. MANUEL, Olive Jane S.
793. MARASIGAN, Christopher Rey C.
794. MARCOS, Mary Jenneane R.
795. MARMOL, Fidelito L.
796. MARQUEZ, Edwin U.
797. MARQUEZ, Jal A.
798. MARRERO, Evelyn A.
799. MARTIN, Monica M.
800. MARTINEZ, Cherry M.
801. MARTINEZ, Janet L.
802. MARTIR, Karla May O.
803. MASANGKAY, Emmerly Jane D.
804. MATE, Michael Vincent A.
805. MATIBAG, Julius G.
806. MATILA, Rodelio S.
807. MAULION, Mischelle R.
808. MAXILOM, Marvin S.
809. MAXINO, Nancy A.
810. MAÑAGO, Sheryl M.
811. MEDIJA, Louela Lynne M.
812. MEJIA, Cecille L.
813. MEJIA, Maritess T.
814. MELECIO-VILLEJO, Ruby L.
815. MELITANTE, Christian George L.
816. MENDEZ, Geraldine C.
817. MENDINUETO, Erwin Edward P.
818. MENDOZA, Anna Charisse L.
819. MENDOZA, Kim Grace A.
820. MENDOZA, Marlon M.
821. MENDOZA, Mary Ann P.
822. MENDOZA, Mayette M.
823. MENDOZA, Perfecto Justino A.
824. MENESES, Geraldine S.
825. MERCADO, Daiza Anne O.
826. MERCADO, Erickson Donn R.
827. MERCADO, Katherine C.
828. MERCADO, JR., Wilfred A.
829. MERNADO, JR., Michael M.
830. MEÑEZ, Kristine Joy M.
831. MIANO, Diana Marie P.
832. MIGRIÑO, Jason R.
833. MILAN, Jurgens SJ.
834. MILLA, Patricia C.
835. MIOLE, Kristofferlean A.
836. MIRANDA, JR., Reinerio G.
837. MISOLA, Gladys V.
838. MITRA, JR., Elmer R.
839. MONDRAGON, Iannoel V.
840. MONGAYA, Anna Khristine C.
841. MONTEALEGRE, Theodore Allan M.
842. MONTEMAYOR, Adrian R.
843. MONTENEGRO, Allen L.
844. MONTERO, Osmond M.
845. MONTEZA, Angelica Diane B.
846. MORALES, Anthony Lawrence M.
847. MORALES, Cynthia Evangeline D.
848. MORALES, Eufel N.
849. MORALES, Giovanni R.
850. MORALES, Leilani C.
851. MORALES, Michelle Frances L.
852. MORANO, IV, Rene Cornelio R.
853. MORENO, JR., Oscar P.
854. MORENO, JR., Paulino H.
855. MUYCO, Mary Love P.
856. NABUA, John Paul PA.
857. NACIONALES, JR., Rafael D.
858. NAFIANOG, Roger L.
859. NAMBATAC, Dave U.
860. NANGKIL, Philip Ray L.
861. NAPARATE, Arsenia A.
862. NARAJOS, Patricia D.
863. NARANJO, Christine Marie L.
864. NARISMA, Juevanrey A.
865. NATANAUAN, Klarisa L.
866. NAVARRO, Tina B.
867. NEFALAR, Marissa Corazon T.
868. NEIS, Maebe T.
869. NEPOMUCENO, Roviel B.
870. NERY, Melanie Johanna C.
871. NGOCHUA, Patricia Cristina T.
872. NICOLAS, Arvil Philipp A.
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874. NICOLAS, Jonathan C.
875. NORA, Paula Katrina L.
876. NOVERO, Brian DS.
877. NUESTRO, Glenn Michael P.
878. NUEVE, Theresa Genevieve C..
879. OBILLOS, Maria Yasmin M.
880. OBIÑA, Eve Jonapaula M.
881. OCAMPO, Robert V.
882. OCAMPO, Shierma F.
883. OCAÑADA-ALEGRE, Amelie O.
884. OCFEMIA, Emil M.
885. OLAÑO, Sheryl L.
886. OLINGAY, Stephen C.
887. OMADTO, JR., Arnold Ninoy P.
888. OMELIO, Princess Claudin C.
889. OMPAD, Julius T.
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891. ONG, Jennifer T.
892. ORBITA, Janis Mahalia A.
893. ORCULLO, Sora Dereka T.
894. ORENCIA, Janice Rhea B.
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896. OROPESA, Cyril C.
897. ORPILLA, Michelle O.
898. ORTEGA, Noel M.
899. OUANO, Ethelbert B.
900. PABALINAS, Michael D.
901. PABELLAN, Abouben Jade R.
902. PABIONA, Esther Joy P.
903. PABLO, Jessibel M.
904. PACASEM, Nurhani C.
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906. PAGAYATAN, Alfred T.
907. PALAC, Lemuel G.
908. PALENCIA, JR., Chulo B.
909. PALILEO, Alena Gale H.
910. PALINES, Erwin B.
911. PALMA, Pilipinas C.
912. PAMINTUAN, Dennis Albert S.
913. PAMMIT, Mari Khris R.
914. PAMONAG, Noli Rey L.
915. PAMPOLINA, Jonathan T.
916. PANER, Linda Lucky Grace C.
917. PANES, Anfred P.
918. PANES, JR., Rolando D.
919. PANGANIBAN, Avigail E.
920. PANGILINAN, Beverly F.
921. PANHON, Raymond G.
922. PARADELA, Glenn Raymond O.
923. PARAISO, Renato A.
924. PARAS, Joannah A.
925. PARONG, Joel Joselito G.
926. PASATIEMPO, Herlyn L.
927. PASCO, Novern Irish A.
928. PASCUAL, Joshua F.
929. PASCUAL, Urvi B.
930. PASION, Paul Emerson M.
931. PASTOR, Noel R.
932. PATALINJUG, Liza Marie S.
933. PATCHO, Jerry B.
934. PAULINO, Carlo A.
935. PAULINO, Paulo A.
936. PAYUMO, Caroline C.
937. PAYUMO, Marie Joy M.
938. PAZ, A.j. Gerardo T.
939. PAÑALES, Rhyan M.
940. PERALTA, Ramses S.
941. PEREDO, Eldric Paul A.
942. PERERA, Jason Bader LL.
943. PEREZ, Lyndon Gabriel C.
944. PEREZ-FERRER, Ruby C.
945. PEÑAFLOR, Aldrin G.
946. PEÑARANDA, Jose Rommel A.
947. PEÑARANDA, Rhyna M.
948. PEÑAS, Stella J.
949. PICCIO, Agnes A.
950. PICIO, Jubal R.
951. PILAR, Joy B.
952. PINEDA, Marco K.
953. PINTOR, Arminda T.
954. PIZARRO, Edwin Joy L.
955. PIÑGA, Vibenditho J.
956. PLACIDO, Lady Liza R.
957. PLAZA, Gaudenis Felix E.
958. POJAS, Philip John L.
959. PONDEMIRA, Katrina B.
960. POPANES, Alex Alberto M.
961. POQUIZ, JR., Eduardo U.
962. PORMENTILLA, Jeland Omer L.
963. PORTOZA, Elyjean D.
964. PORTUGAL, Russel P.
965. POSADAS, John Philip A.
966. POSADAS, Raymond Charles N.
967. POTICANO, Joselita M.
968. PRADO, Reigel A.
969. PREZA, Irma R.
970. PRIELA, Diomer L.
971. PRIETO, Mark Anthony S.
972. PUA, Ian Dominic M.
973. PUEDA, Anna Liza S.
974. PUGEDA, Jordan Neil S.
975. PUJANES, Jay P.
976. PUNO, JR., Rogelio D.
977. PY, Ailyn S.
978. QUANICO, JR., Leonardo B.
979. QUINSAYAS, Prima Jesusa B.
980. QUINTO, Salvador Henry H.
981. QUIROS, Jolex M.
982. QUIROZ, Bernadette V.
983. RABANES, Antonita C.
984. RABANG, Luisa A.
985. RABE, Mark Pepito J.
986. RACHO, Gerald B.
987. RAFAEL, Hyacinth E.
988. RAGSAC, Arceli C.
989. RAMIREZ, Cecily Nerisse C.
990. RAMIREZ, Doris G.
991. RAMIREZ, Renato Oliver A.
992. RAMIREZ, JR., Alfredo O.
993. RAMOS, Beatrix I.
994. RAMOS, Carmen Grace S.
995. RAMOS, Janice Kristine R.
996. RAMOS, Lesalie M.
997. RAMOS, Liza Michelle E.
998. RAMOS, Rechie N.
999. RAMOS, Reezann Keith E.
1000. RAMOS, Ricardo Victor K.
1001. RAMOS, JR., Eduardo F.
1002. RANGGA, Gleenes Dave T.
1003. RAVAL, Jose Roy B.
1004. RAYA, Brando Ray P.
1005. RAYEL, Rosette R.
1006. RAÑESES, Lezelda M.
1007. REAS-POLISTICO, Rosemarie Ann A.
1008. REBUYON, Wilfredo C.
1009. RECOLIZADO, Ma. Nerissa S.
1010. REGALA, Amie T.
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1012. RENTUMA, Juneth A.
1013. REPASO, Jayson G.
1014. REPOL, Judy Alice U.
1015. REYES, Ajay Noreen DS.
1016. REYES, Amanda Regina G.
1017. REYES, Ellen C.
1018. REYES, John Albert T.
1019. REYES, Luz Victoria F.
1020. REYES, Maria Teresa V.
1021. REYES, Mary Ann L.
1022. REYES, Mylene R.
1023. REYES, Ronces Anne S.
1024. REYES, Wendy S.
1025. RIALUBIN, Arlyne I.
1026. RICO, Reywin M.
1027. RIEZA, Sylvia Patricia S.
1028. RIGOR, Maritess R.
1029. RIODIQUE, Karen Anne S.
1030. RIVERA, Alexander A.
1031. RIVERA, Alexander Paul T.
1032. RIVERA, Dante Y.
1033. RIVERA, Jonah P.
1034. RIVERA, Maria Concepcion E.
1035. ROBLES, Joan A.
1036. ROBLES, Margarette T.
1037. RODRIGUEZ, Albert Leonard C.
1038. RODRIGUEZ, Christopher A.
1039. RODRIGUEZ, Irish Mae V.
1040. ROJAS-QUIAMBAO, Merriam Fe G.
1041. ROJO, Rosemarie A.
1042. ROMERO, Rowena V.
1043. RONQUILLO, Victor John Paul H.
1044. ROSALES, May Ann R.
1045. ROSALES, Rosario L.
1046. ROSARIO, Enrico R.
1047. ROSAURO, Allan A.
1048. ROSELL, Collin N.
1049. ROXAS, Vernidia M.
1050. RUBAYA, Maria Salve C.
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1053. RUCKENBROD, Janis Roselle S.
1054. RUIZ, Erwin G.
1055. SABADO, Susan Phoebe R.
1056. SABANGAN, Charina G.
1057. SABER, Raya Avariza V.
1058. SABITSANA, Clemens Angeli B.
1059. SABUNDAYO, Maria Lourdes A.
1060. SACABEN, Rico Leo R.
1061. SACEDON, Janice S.
1062. SACEDON, Oliver M.
1063. SADURAL, Emma Rhea B.
1064. SALAGAN, Decimary DC.
1065. SALATAN, Gideon C.
1066. SALDUA-CASTILLO, Cherry Vi M.
1067. SALEM, Sylvia Jean P.
1068. SALIBAD, JR., David S.
1069. SALINAS, Frances Shanelle G.
1070. SALINAS, Pierre Nikolai M.
1071. SALOMEO, Conrado A.
1072. SALVADOR, Noel N.
1073. SALVANERA, Christian Joyce P.
1074. SALVE, Lalaine P.
1075. SAMANIEGO, Windel Z.
1076. SAMERA, Maria Lovella C.
1077. SAMONTE, Erwin Jonas A.
1078. SAMPAGA, Steven M.
1079. SAMPANG, Darrell Enerico I.
1080. SAMPAYAN, Rexreginald T.
1081. SAMSON, Sean Blenn E.
1082. SAN JUAN, Ernesto C.
1083. SANCHEZ, Analiza D.
1084. SANCHEZ, Dionne Marie M.
1085. SANCHEZ, Donna May P.
1086. SANCHEZ, Yehlen D.
1087. SANDE, Stephanie P.
1088. SANDOVAL, Ronald C.
1089. SANGALANG, Marlene O.
1090. SANOY, Sharon Grace S.
1091. SANTIAGO, Dominador O.
1092. SANTIAGO, Gwen Manuel P.
1093. SANTOS, Agnes B.
1094. SANTOS, Angelo Niño B.
1095. SANTOS, Charlie O.
1096. SANTOS, Rhoesel Ammiel M.
1097. SAQUING, Christine C.
1098. SARCEDA, Ryan R.
1099. SARINAS, Karen Mae G.
1100. SARMIENTO, Jorge Franco S.
1101. SARMIENTO, Maria Robina C.
1102. SARMIENTO, III, Jes Gal B.
1103. SARMIENTO, III, Leonardo A.
1104. SAULOG-MARASIGAN, Macy G.
1105. SAWIT, Clifton James F.
1106. SAY, Loma Linda A.
1107. SAYOG, Arnolita F.
1108. SAÑOSA, JR., Juanito L.
1109. SEBASTIAN, Mia Mary G.
1110. SEBASTIAN, Yolanda S.
1111. SEBIANO, Teresa G.
1112. SEMPRON, Josie C.
1113. SERON, Eugene S.
1114. SEVILLA, Anna Camille L.
1115. SIAPNO-CAGUNGAO, Alma E.
1116. SIBUYAN, Brian Gale T.
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1118. SILLA, Merielle T.
1119. SILO, JR., Benjamin H.
1120. SIMTIM, JR., Eufemio A.
1121. SINGSON, Ma. Veronique R.
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1124. SIONGCO, Emmie-lou L.
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1152. SUPERABLE, Clarissa M.
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The Great Dissenters

2008-03-25T07:33:00.000-07:00

In the case of Romulo Neri vs. Senate Committee On Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et. al. (G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008), six (6) members of the Supreme Court namely Chief Justice Puno and Justices Carpio, Azcuna, Carpio-Morales, Martinez and Ynares-Santiago ruled that the three questions that Neri had refused to answer in the Senate probe are not covered by executive privilege. I do admire these six gallant dissenters who ruled on the strength of their blind loyalty to the Constitution and firm reverence to the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances. The minority ruling in effect wanted to uphold and legitimize the constitutional power of the Senate to compel a witness who refuses to heed a subpoena and reject the Executive Department’s resistance to the Senate’s power of inquiry which is coextensive with the power to legislate.

I salute you, Your Honor!

Prayers For Prayerful Cory

2008-03-25T00:39:00.000-07:00

Rape of Male By Female - Is It Contemplated By R.A. 8353?

2008-03-18T00:10:00.000-07:00

In the Bar Exams Forum, of which I am an active member, I posed the following potential bar question.

Luna, an ambrosial widowed landlady, was enamored with his boarder Michael, a good-looking 26-year old bar reviewee. Naked, Luna silently entered into the room of Michael who was asleep one rainy night. She took off the boxer short of Michael and started manipulating his genital. Meantime, Michael was dreaming of having sex with her favorite classmate. Feeling that Michael was getting an erection, Luna had his genital inserted into her vagina and eventually had carnal knowledge of him. Awaken, Michael shouted for help. Luna was charged with rape by sexual assault.

a) Was the charge proper?

b) What if Michael had a heart attack upon seeing Luna on the top of him and he eventually died? Was Luna liable for the death of Michael?

This question has turned into a lively discussion among the forum members, viz :

Lito Basilio (Law Student)

Let me try to offer an answer. This is both my observation and suggested answer rolled into one.

The reality that males are raped by females is not widely accepted. Some people view it as an impossible act - that a male can’t be sexually assaulted by a female - and others view it as sexually titillating. The existence of female perpetrators and male victims confronts many of our most firmly held notions about women, men, sexuality, power, and sexual assault. It challenges our very beliefs about what sex is.

The myth that men can’t be victimized particularly by women is firmly entrenched in our culture. Many men who dare acknowledge that they were sexually abused by women are cruelly laughed at and humiliated.

Most do not dare say a word about it for fear of feeling any more ashamed than they already feel. Many men who were raped by women feel deeply ashamed of themselves, their sexuality, and their gender.

However, rape perpetrated by women against minors and adults has long been recognized in foreign jurisdictions. There have been many cases in U.S. and African courts where women are convicted of raping men.

Under our jurisdiction, based on expanded definition of rape, rape may now be committed by a female who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 of RA 8353, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting any instrument or object into the anus or vagina of a female, or anus of a male.

If the law penalizes a female for the degrading and perverse act of inserting an instrument or object into the anus of a male, I can see no reason why a more degrading and perverse act of Luna would not be penalized.

I therefore posit that the facts above is within the purview of the expanded definition of rape. Luna was correctly and properly charged. He would be charged with a composite crime of rape with homicide if death of the victim resulted from the rape.

Dark Justice (Law Student)

im a freshman law student, so i hope you guys give me a little more slack

i have just one question: isn't it absurd that it is Luna who caused the insertion of Michael's penis into her vagina and yet she was charged with rape by sexual assault?

as what RA 8353 provides:

Rape is Committed -

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

By way of simplification and emphasis, rape is committed by any PERSON (male of female) who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof (unconscious), shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting any instrument or object (a vagina may be construed as object) into the genital (penis) or anal orifice of another person (male or female)

inserting any instrument or object into the anal orifice i can imagine... but inserting an object or instrument into the penis?

based on the facts, nothing was inserted into the penis.. rather the penis was caused to be inserted into the vagina..

i see a problem in the interpretation of the said provision with regard to the application to the case at bar..

anyways, that's just my humble observation..

Lito Basilio

It really does appear absurd when you apply RA 8353 to the letter.

However, RA 8353 contemplates that a FEMALE commits a crime of rape by sexual assault against a FEMALE or MALE, to wit :

1) by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of a FEMALE.

2) by inserting any instrument or object into the anal orifice of a MALE.

My point is that if the law considers above number 2 as a crime of rape, why a FEMALE who had the penis of an unconscious MALE inserted into her vagina would not be regarded as a crime of rape? The latter act is much more perverse and degrading than a FEMALE’s act of inserting any instrument or object into the anal orifice of a MALE.

I believe the announced purpose of RA 8353 is to expand the definition of rape.

To exclude from the definition the act of Luna, whereas a FEMALE’s act of inserting any object or instrument into the anal orifice of a MALE is included, would be an unintelligible, capricious and arbitrary delimitation of what the law seeks to expand.

There’s no rhyme or reason in giving protection against the FEMALE’s insertion of an instrument or object into the anal orifice of a MALE and yet refusing such protection to a MALE when, without his consent, a FEMALE had his penis inserted into her vagina.

Atty. Fred Pamaos

Allow me to join the fray. As noted in the discussion, the act penalized is: (1) "inserting" the assailant's penis "into" the mouth or anal orifice of the victim; or (2) "inserting" an instrument/or object "into" the genital or anal orifice of the victim. The term "into" is defined as:

Quote:
A preposition signifying to the inside of; within. It expresses entrance, or a passage from the outside of a thing to its interior, and follows verbs expressing motion." (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., p. 822)

In other words, the law, as it currently stands, contemplates that the object (that goes inside an orifice) belongs to the assailant, while the orifice (into which something is inserted) belongs to the victim. In the illustration given above, the object that went inside belongs to the victim, while the orifice belongs to the assailant. It's not within the language of the law.

Lito Basilio

It looks like my advocacy is not gaining ground.

I can’t help but be impressed with Atty. Fred’s argument. But I’m not fully convinced, sir. I believe Luna’s perverse act is within the expanded definition of the crime of rape by sexual assault. My reasons are :

1. Rape is now a crime against persons, meaning the victim may either be a female or male. According to the express language of the law, the crime may now be committed by a female against a male which was not a case in crimes against chastity. The reclassification of the crime of rape now allows rape of male by a female.

2. It is not only the textual elements of the crime of rape by sexual assault that qualifies the felony. I am of the view that other wrongful acts analogous to or much more evil than any elements of the crime of rape by sexual assault have to be taken into account in order not to defeat the very purpose of the law – i.e. to expand the definition of the crime of rape.

Atty. Fred Pamaos

Lito, a good advocate defends his stand even if it momentarily loses ground. Anyway, I fully agree with the 1st paragraph of your statement. As to the second paragraph, criminal laws are strictly construed. If it was the intention of Congress to include acts similar to that of Luna, then it should have done so. Perhaps Sen. Kiko should have included that in his bill; he should have been spared from the biting comment of Macka.

Atty. Ces

my answers:

a) there was no rape. the law is clear. it should not be enlarged beyond its clear meaning.
the crime could possibly be act of lasciviousness.
b) yes. the crime would be (my guess) homicide thru acts of lasciviousness

Ultrasapien (Law Student)

my answer would be:

1. there was no rape by luna.

a woman can commit rape only when, through sexual assault, a woman inserts any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. nothing was inserted into michael's genital or anal orifice. hence no rape.

2. yes luna is criminally liable. ( but i'm not sure for what crime)

first, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. this is par. 1 article 4 of the rpc. for this to be true, the wrongful act done must be at least a felony.

so, is the act of luna of inserting michael's penis into her vagina considered a felony? i think so. although the most appropriate i could think of is unjust vexation. it cannot be acts of lasciviousness be cause the same presupposes that there was no carnal knowledge. neither could it be seduction because michael is not a minor nor a feeble minded person.

the appropriate crime, i think, is homicide thru reckless inprudence

second, a felony is commited not only through dolo or CULPA.

third, the act of luna was the proximate cause of michael's death.

Atty. Ces

a woman can commit rape only when, through sexual assault, a woman inserts any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. nothing was inserted into michael's genital or anal orifice. hence no rape. ]

is this the ONLY manner by which a woman can commit rape?
can she rape another woman?
Ultrasapien (Law Student)
to your question cesmc:

i'd say yes.

art. 266A no. 2 of the RPC says:

"rape is committed......by any person, by any of the circumstances mentioned in par. 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice....."

because of the phrase "shall insert his penis......" the person referred to here is a man because only a man has a penis. a woman has nothing to insert except for an object or instrument

to continue....."or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person"

the last mentioned refers to any person, man or woman. if a woman inserts an object into the genitals or anal orifice of another woman, i'd say there is rape.

a woman has nothing to insert except for an object or instrument. hence, the only way for a woman to commit rape is by inserting an object or instrument in to the genitals or anal orifice of another person.

Atty. Ces

a woman may also commit rape by indispensable participation, like when she holds down the victim while a man commits the actual rape

Atty. Raj

yea, in conspiring to commit rape, they all share equally in the count.

Joshu (Barrister)

Let me join the enlightening discussion, in fact the said principle as correctly pointed out by cesmc was promulgated by the SC in its ruling on People vs. Banzales March 20, 1987 G.R. L-63260, a portion of the decision is reproduced below:

xxx"The trial court correctly found Dialola a woman, equally culpable as a principal together with Banzales for the crime of rape. Appellants' combined actions easily induce the belief that everything had been prearranged between them in order that Banzales might carry out his bestial designs upon the victim. Dialola cooperated in the perpetration of the rape by Banzales by acts without which the crime could not have been consummated. She paved the way by luring the unsuspecting victim into a secluded wooded area, delivering her to Banzales and then covering the girl's mouth so that she could not summon for help. The criminal responsibility of Dialola has been established."xxxx

Elbert (Law Student)

my humble answer to this question is that.. i agree with fred in the sense that the crime committed was not rape by sexual assault. the crime committed, as i see the facts, is only acts of lasciviousness

May The Force Be With You

2008-02-19T06:32:00.000-08:00

Coffee-Table Book (Luid Ka!)

2008-02-13T02:37:00.000-08:00

The much awaited coffee-table book (Luid Ka!) is finally to be launched on 24 February 2008 (Sunday) at Bale Ugnayan Betis, St. James Parish, Betis, Guagua, Pampanga.

The coffee-table book, which showcases the stories and images of the Kapampangan crusade for good governance, is a limited edition hardback published by Kapampangan Marangal, Inc. – a civil society group in Pampanga the promotes good governance and advances responsible citizenship.

The guardians of the first and last bulwarks of democracy are Among Ed’s cabalens.

2008-02-03T06:15:00.000-08:00

The activist Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the last bastion of democracy, hails from Guagua, Pampanga. He is beacon of hope.

Patriotic Justice Jose Melo, the newly appointed chair of the COMELEC, the first bulwark of democracy, is from Angeles City. To borrow the words of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, another Pampanga's illustrious son, Justice Melo has engendered hope for honest, peaceful and orderly elections.

These two honest and courageous Kapampangans along with their fellow cabalen Among Ed are the guiding light for good governance and responsible citizenship.

It is my fervent hope that Pampanga’s favorite daughter President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo come to her sense of history and take a leaf from the book of these extraordinary Kapampangans.

Esperon's extension of tour of duty unconstitutional

2008-01-27T23:55:00.000-08:00

The extension of the tour of duty of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. is patently unconstitutional. Here’s the commandment of the Constitution prohibiting such extension.

The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty. (Sec. 5, para. 7, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution)

Clearly, there’s no war in our midst and no national emergency declared by Congress that may allow the extension of the tour of duty of AFP chief of staff. By extending the chief of staff’s term, GMA may be held liable for culpable violation of the Constitution, a ground for impeachment.

EDSA Dos - extra constitutional or not?

2008-01-18T01:32:00.000-08:00

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate. (Joseph Estrada vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001)

Alphabetized Threat To Panlilio's Good Governance

2008-01-15T03:40:00.000-08:00

A RECOUNT looms in the horizon. A threat of a RECALL is in the air. A REQUIEM (death threat) foreshadows an ominous dark cloud.

These 3 Rs are the so-called Swords of Damocles hanging over Among Ed’s head. Who is the Dionysius in all these threats? Otherwise stated, who are the people behind these 3 Rs?

Let’s focus on the RECALL.

Who is behind this sinister move? Taking a cue from lesson in Arithmetic, let’s have a simple lesson in Multiple Choice.

A) Either one or more of the 3 Ls (Lilia Pineda, Lord of Jueteng, Lolita Hizon)

B) Either one or more of the 3 Js (Joseller Guiao, Jerry Pelayo, Juan Miguel Arroyo)

C) Either one or more of the 3 Ps (Provincial Board members, Pampanga Mayors League, Padrino in the Palace)

D) Either or both of the 2 Ms (Manuel Lapid, Mark Lapid)

E) None of the above

Why they are doing this? Here's why:

Now, it’s up to you to hazard a guess.

More than ever, we must double our RESOLVE to RENOUNCE the RECOUNT. If worse comes to worst, let’s kneel before the Supreme Court to REVERSE the RECOUNT order. Let’s us not give these people enough ROPE. Do not RETREAT. Let’s RESIST and REPEL any attempt to RECALL Among Ed. If they succeed in the initiatory process, let’s REAFFIRM our faith and confidence in Among Ed by electing him again. Lastly, let’s REPULSE any move to RUB OUT the good governor.

In the end the saboteurs of good governance will NEVER succeed because the nation is endowed with a very honorable Kapampangan chief justice manning the last bastion of democracy.

Gov. Ed Panlilio is Inquirer's Filipino of the Year 2007 (Updated 2008.01.15)

2008-01-12T20:27:00.000-08:00

Among Ed is Philippine Daily Inquirer's Filipino of the Year 2007 besting Chief Justice Puno and other personalities who made positive impact last year. Congratulations, Among Ed and to your crusaders!
Here's the article :

MANILA, Philippines -- "Among" Ed Panlilio, priest turned plain-dealing prophet of hope, is the Inquirer's Filipino of the Year for 2007.

The governor of Pampanga, according to Inquirer sources, is facing a do-or-die struggle with the 3 Rs of no-holds-barred political resistance—recount, recall and ''requiem."

The first refers to the election protest his closest rival in the May 2007 polls filed against him; the third to the death threats he has received. The second is an unusual and rarely used tactic in Philippine politics—a recall petition to remove him from office, which his political enemies are poised to file as soon as the one-year condition is met.

All three offer proof that the almost miraculous election victory of Panlilio is a silver dagger thrust at the heart of the vampire known as transactional politics—and the vampire is fighting back.

His victory and the improbable campaign that made it possible will be studied by election strategists and political analysts for a long time to come. His practical but principled approach to governance, which includes both directing the work of idealists and carefully diagnosing festering ills before prescribing a cure, is both exemplary and empowering.

Not least, his first months in office are a showcase of effective executive action.

In the most dramatic turnaround he has engineered, lahar quarrying fees have jumped from less than P30 million during the last full year of his predecessor, Gov. Mark Lapid, to almost P120 million in his first six months in office.

For all these—his inspiring election victory, his surprising political savvy, his initial success despite great difficulty—the Inquirer names Gov. Ed Panlilio as 2007's Filipino of the Year.

The choice reflects the sporadic outbreak of optimism that brightened an otherwise bleak year. Many other harbingers of hope emerged out of the political darkness: Chief Justice Reynato Puno inaugurated a new era in judicial statesmanship by leading the Supreme Court in hosting an unprecedented summit on extrajudicial killings and in launching extraordinary new legal remedies; the Sandiganbayan special division trying deposed President Joseph Estrada on plunder convicted him on two of the four charges, reaffirming the primacy of the rule of law in a well-reasoned and highly convincing decision; the first three Filipino women to climb Everest did so on their first attempt, thrilling a grateful nation; not least, the Overseas Filipino Worker continued to labor in other countries at great personal cost, helping through regular remittances to stabilize the entire trillion-peso economy.

Any of these icons of inspiration would have richly deserved being named Filipino of the Year. But Inquirer editors ultimately chose "Among Ed" Panlilio, in part because the hope he embodies is found where despair is deepest: politics, in the age of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Panlilio, 54, has left an indelible impact on national politics in another, altogether unforeseen way. He exposed the distribution of cash gifts—bundles of cash, contained in paper bags—that took place in Malacañang last October.

In truth, Panlilio did not so much expose the cash gifts handed out to governors (and, as it turned out, also to congressmen) as admit that he received his share: P500,000, handed to him by Bulacan Gov. Jon-Jon Mendoza, who also received the same amount in the same kind of paper bag.

Both governors said they received the money in good faith, and assumed it came from government funds and were to be used for barangay projects.

But the simple act of confirming receipt of the money ignited a political firestorm. Malacañang and its political allies issued many contradictory statements—disavowing any knowledge of the cash gifts, claiming to know their true source, or creating implausible versions of the circumstances.

If the controversial Pulse Asia survey conducted later in October is any gauge, the firestorm quickly consumed much of what was left of President Arroyo's political reputation. That month, a plurality of voting-age Filipinos thought Ms Arroyo was the most corrupt President in history, outranking even the dictator Ferdinand Marcos. It may well be that that dismal finding can be traced directly to Panlilio's disclosure.

This may help explain the intense animosity many Pampanga local officials feel toward Panlilio, many of whom are closely identified with a President who is a favorite provincemate. But the priest-on-leave's candor did not start it. It started when Panlilio dared to throw his social worker's hat (and his parish priest's soutane) into the ring. His upset win hurt the political forces allied with former Provincial Board Member Lilia "Baby" Pineda, the wife of alleged ''jueteng" lord Bong Pineda—they were headed for a victory over Lapid, the lackluster reelectionist incumbent, before Panlilio's entry galvanized the so-called middle forces in Pampanga.

The animosity deepened when Panlilio took his anticorruption platform seriously. When he revamped the lahar quarrying fees collection scheme, he antagonized not only the political forces allied with the Lapids but also many of the local officials who, judging from their incomprehensible reaction to the new arrangement, must have benefited from the old one too.

It is already a part of political lore that Panlilio did not, in fact, intend to run for governor. When he, together with many of his provincemates, realized in 2006 that the looming choice for governor was stark—it was either Mrs. Pineda or the young Mr. Lapid—he joined a concerted effort to look for a third candidate. The group's objective was to persuade eminent Kapampangans, including former Cabinet secretaries and university professors, to offer their provincemates an alternative.

But while the search was begun in optimism, it eventually ran into the depressing reality of Philippine politics. Entrenched political dynasties, the politics of personality, deep-rooted patronage watered by the irrigation systems of jueteng and quarrying fees: The race for Pampanga governor seemed to be over even before it started.

With such long odds, the search looked destined to fail. In the end, Panlilio heeded the call of like-minded citizens and offered himself, reluctantly, as the alternative.

It was not an easy decision. To run for public office, Panlilio needed to go on leave from the priesthood. For someone who has been a priest since 1981 and parish priest of Santiago Apostol church (in Betis, Pampanga) since 1998, the suspension of one's priestly faculties was a wrenching, almost impossible, sacrifice. Finally, a few days before filing his certificate of candidacy, Panlilio met with his superior, Archbishop Paciano Aniceto of San Fernando, and asked for and received a dispensation.

The rival political camps had extensive political networks and even (both parties claimed) the tacit support of Ms Arroyo. Lacking both the money and the network, supporters of the third way in Pampanga had yet an abundance of idealism. Volunteers multiplied; donations started to pour in.

What had started as a search had metamorphosed into a movement. Kapampangans from around the world spread the word. Politicians in Metro Manila took special notice. Four of the country's top election lawyers crossed political lines to offer their services to Panlilio, for free.

The race was tight, violent and dirty. But the groundswell of support for Panlilio that began the day he filed his certificate using a "kariton" helped carry the day. With 219,706 votes, a mere 1,200 over Pineda's 218,559 and only 9,000-plus over Lapid's 210,875, the Commission on Elections declared him the winner.

His victory made him the first priest to be elected governor in the country's history. It also inspired many Filipinos, not only in Pampanga or throughout the archipelago but even those among the OFW diaspora, that the light of hope can shine even in the blackest night.

Below is the Governor's letter to PDI.

Republic of the Philippines
Province of Pampanga

Office of the Governor

January 14, 2008

Dear Editors,

Greetings of God’s peace and love!

Thank you very much for the distinct honor of being recognized as Filipino of the Year.

I am humbled when I realized that thousands of volunteers and other people of hope have nurtured and planted the crusade for good governance and responsible citizenship. The credit of being Filipino of the Year truly belongs to them.

I also recognize the expressions of support the crusade has received from Filipinos all over the country and even the world. Their aspiration for a meaningful and institutionalized change inspires us to move on more decisively, for their encouragement has proven that we are not alone.

We therefore call on everyone to unite and reconcile in our desire for a renewed Philippines by their espousal of their crusade for good governance and responsible citizenship in their respective communities and workplaces, changing our country one Filipino at a time.
Again, thank you very much.

EDDIE T. PANLILIO
Governor

Achilles' Heel in the Steely Facade of Hillary Clinton

2008-01-09T21:00:00.000-08:00

In this video, Clinton's voice cracked and her eyes welled up with tears as she spoke about her passion for the election as well as for America. A fair number of watchers believe she was doing it for the camera; a phony effort to elicit sympathy.
Scripted or not, such display of emotion is a hole-in-one masterstroke that helped the revival of Hillary’s presidential hopes.

Are Filipinos ready for a "Black" President?

2008-01-09T06:50:00.000-08:00

Recently a member of media jokingly asked Jejomar Binay if the Filipinos are ready for a “Black” president. He retorted in jest, “I’m a darkhorse”.

Seriously, Jojo Binay has been mentioned in the media as a possible presidential hopeful. Will he run for president?

If he was true to his words, he will not.

He was once asked about rumors that he might run for the presidency. The mayor was said to have paused and subtly deflected the topic "I always believe that winning the presidency is a matter of destiny. I heard that from Cory; she was the one who said that. Running the city is hard; but let me just say that I want to be remembered as a good administrator. I think I know how to administer. Probably the only difference between running a business and running government is that in business, you can quantify your success through the profits you earn. In our case, it's not quantifiable because it's service. If there's any gauge at all, it's probably the result of the elections, because if you win overwhelmingly, you're probably on the right track."

Mark his words!

A One-Dollar Crusade For Ed Panlilio

2008-01-02T01:28:00.000-08:00

How would you like to launch a historical fight against graft and corruption in the Philippines and “buy” back morality in our government --- all for just One Dollar?

You and I have always abhorred the corruption among our government officials in the Philippines, from top to bottom, and deplored the sad state of our country, where more than 70% of our of our people wallow in massive poverty. While the issue is a complex one, the most obvious etiology of this shameful malady is the overwhelming graft and corruption among our amoral and decadent government leaders.

Would you be willing to invest a dollar --- yes, one single US dollar --- in the fight against graft and corruption in the Philippines?

Leading us in this battle is a man of God, the Reverend Father “Among Ed” Panlilio, the newly elected “Miracle” Governor of Pampanga, a man of dignity and integrity.

What happened in that province is amazingly unbelievable. A humble priest, without political experience, without a bank account, without a political machinery, beating two “unbeatable” seasoned, well-funded, and powerful political giants. “Impossible,” said the political gurus when “Among Ed” first started his crusade. But the Greater Power above obviously had a grander plan for “Among Ed,” and proved the pundits wrong. Suddenly, there was hope for the Philippines.

Armed with his unblemished character, moral ascendancy, love of country, and a strong commitment to honesty and transparency in government, “Among Ed” handily won the election, in spite of widespread vote-buying and rampant cheating. It was evident that a visionary leader with integrity can truly inspire and bring out the best in the Filipino.

The billions of “missing” revenues from the Lahar collection under the past administrations, which Governor Panlilio has discovered since he assumed office June 30, 2007, is only the tip of the iceberg of the invasive cancer of graft and corruption afflicting every level of government in the entire country.

Unfortunately, an honest man makes crooks and villains nervous and uncomfortable, so there is now a move to eliminate “Among Ed, or oust him thru a Recall, courtesy of his enemies, including the majority of the town mayors who have lost their personal cut from the Lahar collection and other government projects., since Governor Panlilio took over.

One can easily imagine what he, as a man of God, of honesty and decency, of principle and genuine love of country, can do when elected President of the Philippines. A dream, yes. A tall order, definitely. An impossible task? No, not with the Divine Providence, you, and people power on his side!

Governor Panlilio has adopted Gawad Kalinga as the pillar of his vision for Pampanga and the nation. His crusade is gaining speed and momentum, and like Tony Meloto’s GK, it will soon be unstoppable. Two giant national religious groups are now supporting “Among Ed.” Filipinos around the world are rejoicing and rallying behind him. And we want you to be a part of this historical transformation.

Come fly with Governor Panlilio in this moral crusade. Our country and our neglected poor need heroes like you in our battle for morality in government, for justice and dignity for our people. This is, indeed, a revolution. Not a revolution of arms where blood will be shed, but a revolution of ideals and of principle, where dreams and vision, sweat and tears shall bathe the nation clean.

All this crusade needs is your personal commitment and moral support for “Among Ed,” an investment for the future of the Philippines. Let’s not miss this opportunity. Let’s use our power to help change our country for the better. The Reverend “Among Ed” Panlilio is heaven-sent and is the hope for our ailing nation.

Please make your check for one dollar, or whatever amount you wish, payable to: FUND FOR HOPE, and mail it to: 1830 Mirmar Road, Munster, Indiana, 46321, USA, or to Buenaventura Condominium, 62 E. Osmena St., Guadalupe, Cebu City, 6000, Philippines. Kindly include your full name and email address for our Historical Archive. This will be the best one-dollar investment you’ll ever make.

Join the revolution, help our country and our people, and leave a proud and lasting legacy for our children and the future generations to cherish with honor and dignity.

May God bless you and your loved ones! God bless the Philippines!

This article is written by Philip S. Chua, M.D. (photo is shown above), Chairman of Filipino United Network (USA) and Vice President of Far East Operations Cardiovascular Hospitals of America, L.L.C.

Dr. Chua is Chairman Emeritus of the Far Eastern University- Dr. Nicanor Reyes School of Medicine Alumni Foundation, a 501(c)3 corporation in New Jersey. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Far Eastern University NR Medical Foundation in the Philippines.

Dr. Chua is also a weekly health columnist of six newspapers, 3 in the United States and 3 in the Philippines, and a Manila Times Publication magazine, HealthNEWS. He is married to Farida Isip-Chua, M.D., a retired pediatrician, with whom he has five children, who are all physicians, and four of them married to physicians also.

Recall of Gov. Ed Panlilio

2007-12-29T01:41:00.000-08:00

Democratic experience, here and abroad, shows that the right of recall is a double-edged sword. Rightly used, it can promote the greater good. Wrongly used, it can result in greater evil. (Chief Justice Reynato Puno)

The recall bid against Gov. Ed Panlilio is carried by PDI today. I’m sure this issue will be the talk of the town in the days to come.

Here are the FAQs on recall for ease of understanding and reference.

What is a recall in the context of Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160)?

A recall is a power granted to the electorate to remove an elected official for loss of confidence.

What does loss of confidence mean?

Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate.

Whether or not the electorate has lost confidence in an incumbent is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. (Evardone vs. COMELEC et. al., GR No. 94010, 2 December 1991)

What is the purpose of recall?

While recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates, it is a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. In other words, recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purpose as a direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government. (Angobung v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 245 [1997])

The bottomline is that our law intends recall as a mechanism of good government. It can never fulfill that intent if we allow its use to foment too much politics. (Claudio vs. COMELEC et. al, G.R. No. 140560, 4 May 2000)

How shall the recall of a governor be commenced?

The recall of a governor shall be commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the province concerned and supported by at least 10% of registered voters, provided, however, that in no case shall the required petitioners be less than 45,000. (Section 1, RA 9244)

Obiter

In the case of Pampanga, the required petitioners must be at least 98,703 which represent 10% of the total number of registered voters in Pampanga as of 20 April 2007 based on the records of COMELEC (www.comelec.gov.ph).

In other words, Guaio et. al. may require at most 98,703,000 pesos (if the signature of a petitioner is priced at 1,000 pesos per person) just to commence the recall of Among Ed. This excludes the hundreds of millions of pesos to be used to buy votes during the recall election itself.

What happens next after the commencement of a recall?

The process of recall shall be effected in accordance with the following procedures:

1. A written petition for recall duly signed by the representatives of the petitioners shall be filed in the COMELEC provincial office.

2. If the petition is found to be sufficient in form, the Comelec shall form the issuance of the certification, provide the official sought to be recalled a copy of the petition, cause its publication in a national newspaper of general circulation and a newspaper of general circulation in the locality.

3. The Comelec shall proceed independently with the verification and authentication of the signatures of the petitioners and registered voters contained therein. The filing of any challenge or protest shall be allowed which shall be ruled upon with finality within 15 days from the date of filing of such protest or challenge.

4. The Comelec shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled.

5. The Comelec shall set the date of the recall election, which shall not be later than 45 days upon the completion of the procedure outlined above. The official sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate to the position to be voted upon.

6. The official sought to be recalled may file petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking the nullification of the resolution of the COMELEC giving due course to the petition for the recall.

What are the limitations of a recall?

1. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (para. a, Section 74, RA 7160)

2. No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official's assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election. (para. b, Section 74, RA 7160)

If no recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official's assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election, does it mean that Among Ed cannot be recalled until after 30 June 2008?

In the case of Claudio vs. COMELEC et.al., supra, the Supreme Court held that the term "recall" refers to the recall election and not to initiation of recall proceeding. The initiation of recall "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office." Hence, a recall election for governor in Pampanga cannot be held until after 30 June 2008. However, the initiation of recall proceedings (commencement, filing of petition with the COMELEC and etc.) is not prohibited within the one-year period.

In other words, what is forbidden are : (1) the holding of recall election within one year from the date the official assumed office, and (2) holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras vs. COMELEC (264 SCRA 48, 54 [1996]), para. (b)construed together with para. (a) of Section 74, RA 7160 "merely designate the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office."

When shall a recall take effect?

The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.(Section 72, RA 7160)

Panlilio's Electoral Victory ---Year's Most Inspiring Event

2007-12-26T21:24:00.000-08:00

When Among Ed took off his robe and ran for governor of Pampanga a considerable number of cynics viewed him as having caught up in the romance of noble deeds and pursuit of unreachable goals.

But scores of thousands who believed in his platform of good governance, civic participation, social innovation, and poverty alleviation followed his cause vigilantly and hundreds more were nudged into the path of loyalty to his crusade. His campaign engendered a lot of support here and abroad even from people who have nothing to do with Pampanga politics.

Among Ed won. He magnanimously humbled the political king and queen of power politics in Pampanga who had all the goons, golds, guns and glitters to buy, terrify, and wheedle the electorate. Succored by an army of moral crusaders, he mightily crushed and brought the gigantic patron/patroness of evil politics down on their knees with a slingshot of prayers. The winning margin was only 1,147 votes – a meager 1,147,000 pesos for vote purchasers who bought votes 1,000 pesos per vote. How amazing.

Admittedly, Among Ed’s electoral vitory is the year’s most inspiring event in the country. A leading newspaper aptly dubbed it a miracle ordained from above. To me, it is God’s mysterious way of manifesting that nothing exceeds the authority that comes from above.

Happy Christmas To All!

2007-12-20T02:43:00.000-08:00

Do They Know It's Christmas

It's Christmastime; there's no need to be afraid
At Christmastime, we let in light and we banish shade
And in our world of plenty we can spread a smile of joy
Throw your arms around the world at Christmastime
But say a prayer to pray for the other ones
At Christmastime

It's hard, but when you're having fun
There's a world outside your window
And it's a world of dread and fear
Where the only water flowing is the bitter sting of tears

And the Christmas bells that ring there
Are the clanging chimes of doom
Well tonight thank God it's them instead of you
And there won't be snow in Africa this Christmastime

The greatest gift they'll get this year is life
Oh, where nothing ever grows, no rain or rivers flow
Do they know it's Christmastime at all?

Here's to you, raise a glass for ev'ryone
Here's to them, underneath that burning sun
Do they know it's Christmastime at all?

Feed the world
Feed the world

Feed the world
Let them know it's Christmastime again
Feed the world
Let them know it's Christmastime again

May a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship and reacquired it still practice law in the Philippines?

2007-12-18T07:10:00.000-08:00

Banjamin Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), he reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship and reacquired it still practice law in the Philippines?

In B.M. No. 1678 dated 17 December 2007, the Supreme Court answered in affirmative. Said the High Tribunal :

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.” Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

The Birth of New Politics in Pampanga

2007-12-08T05:16:00.000-08:00

A couple of months before the May 2007 elections, the electoral result for governorship in Pampanga was a foregone conclusion.

However, the course of history changed that.

Agitated and out of desperation, a group of conscientious Kapampangans conceived what was otherwise viewed as inconceivable. As the election was approaching, they conceived the idea of a priest running for the governorship. They found a father in Father Ed Panlilio, a symbol for Kapampangan dignity and conscience. Fr. Ed agreed to father what these well-intentioned individuals had conceived.

The conceived idea snowballed and emerged into a pregnant crusade. While the struggle suffered innumerable birth pains as the election drew nearer and endured birth pangs during the election day, Pampanga finally gave birth to a new brand of politics in the province now enjoyed by the Kapampangangs under the moral leadership of Fr. Ed Panlilio.

But given the extreme pain during the birthing process, birth trauma has set in. The enemy of good governance has claimed that the birth of new politics is illegitimate. In fact, they went to the Comelec and contested its legitimacy. Our elected board members and mayors have sided with those who question the paternity of the new politics. They refuse to embrace and cuddle the newborn era of moral, transparent and honest governance.

Incidentally, a coffee table book will pay homage to those individuals who conceived and midwived the birth of new brand of politics in Pampanga. The book, which visually tells the stories of the Kapampangan Crusade for Good Governance, is to be launched in the last week of January 2008.(book cover is shown above)

All About Curfew

2007-12-03T05:43:00.000-08:00

During the medieval age, a CURFEW signifies the ringing of a bell at fixed time in the evening as an order to cover the hearths (fireplace) and prepare for sleep. The intention was to prevent the untended fires from conflagrations. The definition of curfew had however been expanded by modern writers. The modern extended sense of "periodic restriction of movement" had evolved by 1800s.

In the Philippines, the imposition of curfew by parents, especially on minor children, has been in our culture as far as memory could recall. It used to be a family affair without any interference from the State. The duty to enforce curfew regulations devolved upon the parents or guardians. When I was little I remember we were forbidden to be in the streets at a prescribed time. We obediently adhered to the rules for fear of parental reprimand or corporal punishment. In our neighborhood no minors were allowed to stay outdoors before the stroke of midnight. That’s how disciplined we were scores of years ago.

On 22 September 1972, however, the cultural context of curfew had changed. Marcos, who both wielded executive and legislative powers, had criminalized curfew. The late dictator issued General Order No. 4 ordering the enforcement of a curfew throughout the Philippines between the hours of twelve midnight and four o’clock in the morning during which no person shall be allowed to move outside his or her residence unless he or she is authorized in writing to do so by the military commander-in-charge.

Not contended, he promulgated Presidential Decree No. 603 on 10 December 1974 enjoining all city or municipal councils to prescribe curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions.

With the lifting of Martial Law years later, the curfew imposed upon all persons had automatically been revoked. But PD 603 had remained in force. In fact, it has been so until now as this law has not been repealed.

Under our present legal system, is the imposition of a curfew legal? Yes, PD 603 allows it subject to certain conditions, which are : 1) the curfew hours shall be imposed upon minors only, 2) a local ordinance imposing a curfew shall be enacted, and 3) it is warranted by local situations.

Was GMA’s imposition of curfew upon ALL PERSONS in Manila and Regions 3 and 4-A on 29 November 2007 legal? Here are the views of some of our noted lawyers on the legality of curfew imposition.

1. As an inherent and extraordinary power of the State, police power is exercised through legislation. A curfew imposed without any law or legal order is illegal and unconstitutional. (Atty. Theodore Te)

2. The President has no authority to curtail freedom of movement. Also, such a directive needs to be in writing and has to be published. (Atty. Marichu Lambino).

3. The curfew imposition is unlawful and contrary to the Constitution — our right to liberty, our right to travel, our constitutionally guaranteed rights that cannot be curtailed or disregarded by executive order. Even curfews imposed in town and barangays need local ordinance. (Sen. Francis Pangilinan)

Meantime, Atty. Fred Pamaos has raised some interesting questions in his blog as regards curfew imposition, viz :

xxxx there are two legal questions that should be addressed: (1) Can the President impose a curfew without any delegation of powers from Congress?; and (2) If such delegation is not required and the imposition of curfew is authorized under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President, did the President comply with the constitutional requirements (the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power)?

Personally, I feel the recent curfew was imposed without clear legal basis. There’s no law empowering the President to impose curfew on ALL PERSONS. What we have is curfew regulations on minors only. GMA had consciously overstepped the limitations of her constitutional powers at the expense of curtailing our freedom to travel and move outside our home; our freedom to watch last full show movie at SM cinema, our liberty to listen to music at a nearby bar, our freedom to enjoy our friends' birthdays and etc. Even under her commander-in-chief powers she has no authority to impose curfew on all citizens. A curfew on ALL PERSONS can only be imposed if there is a law enacted by Congress to that effect delegating to the President the police power to executive the same.

Obviously, GMA treated the curfew imposition as a test case. The curfew has ruffled a lot of feathers but no one has lifted a finger to question its legality before the Supreme Court. Unless the curfew is judicially challenged, GMA may reimpose it again and again. Some may say the complaint will not prosper because the curfew was already lifted and, therefore, it is now moot and academic. I disagree. The Supreme Court will not render the complaint moot and academic. Said the Supreme Court in Randolf David vs. Arroyo :

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Ergo, will someone rise and judicially challenge the legality of GMA’s curfew imposition?

Panlilio's courage is of the moral kind, one man alone against an evil system.

2007-11-27T20:30:00.000-08:00

Here’s a movingly expressive, illuminative and telling opinion of Sunstar columnist Ram Mercado of Sunstar Pampanga about the state of political affairs in Pampanga. This author’s reading and observation on Pampanga’s current affairs is indubitably truthful, factual and unimpeachable.

THE Sangguniang Panlalawigan, I understand, has given Governor Panlilio a "failing grade" for the past semester.

I would give the provincial board a "high passing mark" for its own performance--- in obstructionism and "sipsipan".

As a failed student, Amond Ed, at least was honest. He never cheated, much less solicited funding support from political patrons. He got fund support from the Golden Girl (unsolicited) while the detractors got theirs from the Million Dollar Baby (solicited).

In denouncing the governor's weak performance, the SP members led by the vice governor should acknowledge their own failure as the other partner in provincial governance. It's the other horse in the team, but pulling - and being pulled - in the opposite direction.

All right, Panlilio was found wanting in building costly infrastructure projects, the certain sources of commissions and kickbacks.

In former times, such projects earned revenues for the ruling executives. Not a few honorable members of the board got their share of the bounty. This is what is found wanting in the new governor, his failure to bribe, his inability to provide and the sin of improvidence. Thus, the failing grade given the amateur politician.

Well, it was the fault of a few hundred people who did not vote for Mrs. Lilia "Baby" Pineda, or the accidental burning of Mabalacat ballot boxes which contents could have spelled the difference. Otherwise the Capitol is in a perpetual "happy hour."

If Mrs. Pineda were the elected governor, I am certain the same board members today would rate her with the highest marks. Why not, when the lady is known to be a philanthropist and a generous giver?

In the drawing board and about to be implemented, I read, are scores of infra projects that are under transparent and meticulous bidding rules, including the purchase of medical supplies, drugs, and equipment for the district hospitals. Their procurement under a corrupt system means dirty money for any crook.

So far Panlilio has rated poorly in this area, according to the Board some of whose members are professional politicians, used to wheeling and dealing, and well-versed in rigged bidding.

Pampangos should not expect spectacular development and growth in the present set-up. Two horses pulling the wagon on different directions do not make an ideal team. One horse looks skyward, the other to Lubao. The wagon moves, if at all, as it is bogged down in inertia.

Panlilio is loyal to his gospel principle, the other team is loyal to its patrons. He works by values, the other by compromise. It is a fight between two parties: the NP [Nagiisang Pari] vs. the KBL [Kay Baby Lahat].

The nation's chief problem - so in Pampanga - is corruption. Panlilio is guaranteed not to steal public money. That is his best performance. If that's all he can be in three years, we have a great future. Better an upright citizenry in a high moral ground than a corrupt people in endless happy hour.

Panlilio does not play "sipsip" to anyone, not even to the First Lady. Certain SP members rate very high in that game. The mayors, too, who adore the First Baby.

Panlilio's courage is of the moral kind, one man alone against an evil system. The board members find courage in their number.

Tormentors become bolder when they gang up on someone like a harmless priest who is expected not to fight back . He is an easy prey by predators operating as a group.

In other times, if I know many of the board members, most of them would even do "mano" to Among Ed when he was in active ministry.

Pampanga is indeed in bad times as far as governance is concerned. This is what patronage money, from quarrying and illegal gambling or combined, can perpetrate using basically decent, educated, and well-intentioned public servants to its ends, for its purpose.

In the political history of the province, no single family in the past has ever influenced the events of public administration, changed the course of local politics, and molded the free will of voters than the power family which the present provincial board appeared subservient to.

This reality makes a good man like Among Ed a freak in the political circus, a pariah among the Pharisees and a whipping boy of a gang who found fake courage in their number, encouraged and hypnotized by their patron.

Happy Birthday, Ninoy!

2007-11-25T20:19:00.000-08:00

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ARRIVAL SPEECH
The prepared speech that was never read

I have returned on my free will to join the ranks of those struggling to restore our rights and freedoms through non-violence.

I seek no confrontation. I only pray and will strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on justice.

I am prepared for the worst, and have decided against the advice of my mother, my spiritual adviser, many of my tested friends and a few of my most valued political mentors.

A death sentence awaits me. Two more subversion charges, both calling for death penalties, have been filed since I left three years ago and are now pending with the courts.

Three years ago when I left for an emergency heart bypass operation, I hoped and prayed that the rights and freedoms of our people would soon be restored, that living conditions would improve and that blood-letting would stop.

I could have opted to seek political asylum in America, but I feel it is my duty, as it is the duty of every Filipino, to suffer with his people especially in time of crisis. I never sought not have I been given any assurances, or promise of leniency by the regime. I return voluntarily armed only with a clear conscience and fortified in the faith that in the end, justice will emerge triumphant. According to Gandhi, the willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful answer to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God and man.

Rather than move forward we have moved backward. The killings have increased, the economy has taken a turn for the worse and the human rights situation has deteriorated.

During the martial law period, the Supreme Court heard petitions for habeas corpus. It is most ironic after martial law has allegedly been lifted, that the Supreme Court last April ruled it can longer entertain petitions for habeas corpus for person detained under the Presidential Commitment Order, which covers all so-called national security cases and which under present circumstances can cover almost anything.

The country is far advanced in her times of trouble. Economic, social and political problems bedevil the Filipino. These problems may be surmounted if we are united. But we can be united only if all the rights and freedoms enjoyed before September 21, 1972 are fully restored.

The Filipino asked for nothing more, but will surely accept nothing less, than all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 1935 constitution – the most sacred legacies from the founding fathers.

Yes, the Filipino is patient, but there is a limit to his patience. Must we wait until that patience snaps?

The nationwide rebellion is escalating and threatens to explode into a bloody revolution. There is a growing cadre of young Filipinos who have finally come to realize that freedom is never granted, it is taken. Must we relive the agonies and the blood-letting of the past that brought forth our republic or can we sit down as brothers and sisters and discuss our differences with reason and goodwill?
I have often wondered how many disputes could have been settled easily had the disputants only dared to define their terms.

So as to leave no room for misunderstanding, I shall define my terms:
Six years ago, I was sentenced to die before a firing squad by a military tribunal whose jurisdiction I steadfastly refused to recognize. It is now time for the regime to decide. Order my immediate execution or set me free.

I was sentenced to die for allegedly being the leading communist leader. I am not a communist, never was and never will be.

National reconciliation and unity can be achieved, but only with justice, including justice for our Muslim and Ifugao brothers. There can be no deal with a dictator. No compromise with dictatorship.

In a revolution there can really be no victors, only victims. We do not have to destroy in order to build.

Subversion stems from economic, social, and political causes and will not be solved by purely military solution: It can be curbed not with ever increasing repression but with a more equitable distribution of wealth, more democracy and more freedom.

For the economy to get going once again, the working man must be given his just and rightful share or his labor, and to the owners and managers must be restored the hope where there is so must uncertainty if not despair.

On one of the long corridors of Harvard University are carved in granite the words of Archibald Macleish: ‘How shall freedom be defended? By arms when it is attacked by arms; by truth when it is attacked by lies; by democratic faith when it is attacked by authoritarian dogma. Always and in the final act, by determination and faith.’

I return from exile and an uncertain future with only determination and faith to offer – faith in our people and faith in God."

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Shall Husband Be Required To Wear Scarlet Letter?

2007-11-18T05:59:00.000-08:00

Historically, adultery was harshly punished as a breach of the husband's rights. Rigidly severe penalties - as divorce, public shaming, stoning, devouring by dogs, mutilation, and death - were imposed upon the adulterous wife by her aggrieved spouse or law. It was as though the wife was regarded as a property of the husband. On the other hand, the aggrieved husband could get even with the adulterous wife and the latter was prohibited from seeking justice against the unfaithful husband.

In the Code of Napoleon, “a man could ask to be divorced from his wife if she committed adultery, but the philandery of the husband was not a sufficient motive for divorce unless he had kept his concubine in the family home.”

In the early Roman Law , there was no such thing as the crime of adultery on the part of a husband towards his wife.

The Jews believe that only a married woman engaging in sexual intercourse with another man shall be regarded as adultery. In the Mosaic Law, adultery was taken to mean merely the carnal intercourse of a wife with a man who was not her legal husband. The sexual intercourse of a married man with a single woman was not constitutive of adultery.

The passport of the husband to indulge in sexual intercourse with other woman who was not his wife may be explained in the words of Plutarch, viz :

"We keep mistresses for our pleasures, concubines for constant attendance, and wives to bear us legitimate children and to be our faithful housekeepers. Yet, because of the wrong done to the husband only, the Athenian lawgiver Solon allowed any man to kill an adulterer whom he had taken in the act.”

The above discrimination which was the practices of ancient peoples was cast in stone. It was set forth in almost all ancient codes of law.

Why then our modern legislators seemed to have not departed from the belief of the remote past and perpetuated the disadvantaged position of the wife when they legislated the laws on adultery and concubinage in 1932?

Under the Revised Penal Code, one single sexual intercourse by a wife with a man not her husband already amounts to a crime of adultery (Art. 333). This is different in the case of the husband who commits concubinage only when he keeps a mistress in conjugal dwelling with a woman not his wife, or cohabits with a concubine in any other place (Art. 334). Clearly, the conditions under which concubinage may be committed are difficult to prove, which will permit the husband to continuously indulge in sexual infidelity and still unscathed from the application of the law.

Realizing the discriminatory nature of our penal laws on adultery and concubinage, three senators of the 14th Congress are now seeking to “punish marital fidelity or sexual intercourse by a husband or wife with another person not his or her spouse, amending the crimes of adultery and concubinage under the Revised Penal Code, to eliminate the double standard between husband and wife and promote the fundamental equality before the law of women and men”.

The three bills filed by Senators Santiago, Gordon and Villar are consistent with Art. XI, Sec. 14 of the 1987 Constitution which mandates the State to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. In the words of Sen. Santiago, “this requires the State to apply the law regardless of gender”.

Kudos to the collective wisdom of the three lawmakers!

Pampanga’s Only Hope Under Siege

2007-11-12T20:59:00.000-08:00

Harvey Keh , an idealist young fellow who previously wrote controversial letters titled : “What will make me leave the Philippines : an open letter to every Filipino” and “Seven things that shouldn’t happen in the May elections”, has written another letter to every Filipino.

This time, Harvey is drumming up support for Pampanga Gov. Ed Panlilio who is now besieged by Pampanga local officials and other GMA’s apologists over his exposé of alleged bribery in Malacañang last 11 October 2007.

I'm putting out here his letter to demonstrate my support for Governor Panlilio.

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Mind you, the speed with which this letter is being circulated in the internet is so amazing that the Philippine Daily Inquirer carried it in its breaking news 12 November 2007. Several bloggers and sites have already published this letter (www.amonged.org, www.manilabaywatch.blogspot.com, www.pamagcusa.org, etc.) and others have been asked to do the same.

The support for Among Ed steadily gains ground and will soon snowball to reach a critical mass.

Thank you, Harvey!

Dear Fellow Filipinos,

Good day to you!

Last October 13 , Governor Ed Panlilio of Pampanga came out to declare that he was given P500,000.00 in cash which came from a Palace Staff Member in Malacañang. The money was allegedly given for baranggay projects and to support candidates for the upcoming baranggay elections.

Since Gov. Panlilio's admission, there have been other local officials and congressmen who have admitted to receiving money from Malacañang as well. Up until today we still don't know where this money really came from.

But since then, Gov. Panlilio has been under fire because of doing the right thing. Rightnow, local officials in Pampanga led by Vice-Gov. Yeng Guiao are ganging up on him and marginalizing him by not respecting his authority as governor. Media Publications in Pampanga are even being used to destroy his credibility. If one looks at Gov. Panlilio's performance thus far in the less than 6 months that he has been inoffice, the results would speak for itself. He was able to raise the same amount of quarry taxes in less than 2 months compared to the former governor who raised the same amount in 1 year. Due to this, mayors and board members are now demanding part of this collection money and dare blackmailing Gov. Panlilio by not passing important policies that will benefit the constituencies of Pampanga.

Isn't this a familiar refrain in our country? Someone does good and yet he is often punished for doing what is right? And worse, while this is happening many of us just turn a blind eye without doing anything. We just shrug it off and move on with our lives. It is no wonder why majority of our government leaders are becoming bolder and bolder in becoming corrupt since for them no one would dare complaint about it. In short, we deserve the kind of leaders that we have because we continue to do nothing despite the fact that we see that there is something wrong.

And this is why I am writing to appeal to you right now, I'd like to ask for a few minutes of your time to send an email of support to Gov. Ed Panlilio, let us all tell him that we are behind him in his quest for the Truth. What is at stake here is not only the people of Pampanga but the nation as a whole. Gov. Ed exposed what has long been happening in Malacañang and now he is being punished for it. Will you do something about it?

Please help us by forwarding this email to all your friends.

Harvey S. Keh, 27, is the Director for Youth Leadership and Social Entrepreneurship at the Ateneo de Manila University's School of Government and a Fellow at the Asian Institute of Management's Mirant Center for Bridging Societal Divides. He is also the Executive Director of AHON Foundation, an organization that helps promote literacy by building public elementary school libraries.

Criminalizing Necrophilia

2007-11-12T03:38:00.000-08:00

The Philippines has no statute criminalizing necrophilia or an act of engaging in sexual intercourse with the corpse.

At most, a necrophile may be held liable only for violation of Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes the act of blackening the memory of one who is dead or desecration of the dead under Art. 309 of the New Civil Code which merely gives rise to liability for damages.

In an attempt to plug the lacuna in our legal system by penalizing necrophiles or those who derive sexual satisfaction by having sexual intercourse with a female corpse, Senate President Villar filed SB No. 1038 on 4 July 2007 criminalizing necrophilia or carnal knowledge with the dead. Under the bill, a person found guilty of necrophilia shall suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death plus a fine.

I do not agree that necrophilia shall be defined as a separate crime.

The author of the bill proposes to place the crime of necrophilia immediately under the crime of rape in the Revised Penal Code. That may be misplaced. As lawyers and law students know, rape is a crime against person. If it becomes a crime, necrophilia may not be placed under the category of crimes against person for the simple reason that a corpse is no longer a person upon death. At the same breath and for the same reason, the same cannot be put under the crimes against chastity.

I submit that necrophilia be defined not as a separate crime but only as a special aggravating or qualifying circumstances for the act of blackening the memory of one who is dead imposing a graver penalty thereof.

I find also the penalty too harsh. Reclusion perpetua to death is so much for a sick man. Necrophilia is a disorder. In western countries, necrophiles undergo psychoactive drug treatments including chemical castration. In the United States, there is no federal legislation specifically barring sex with a corpse.

What’s your take?

Not yet Rene, not yet!

2007-11-10T20:03:00.000-08:00

“No, I ask not for a revolution, but reform. If the young 'uns do not now
condemn the ways of the trapos, we are lost. To think that a number of the barracudas today were used to Spartan lifestyles during the Marcos years, it pains to see how they validate Oscar Wilde's observation that everything can be resisted except temptation. The young 'uns must speak now for the day they see the truth and cease to speak is the day they begin to die. The cruelest lies are often told in silence. Two mistakes are irrevocable, speaking when it is time to be silent and being silent when it is time to speak. Useful clichés.”

Those are the eloquent words of the acerbic Atty. Rene A. V. Saguisag, a bar topnotcher, a former Senator and cabinet member, a human rights lawyer, a thinker, a moralist, a freedom fighter, a journalist, a reformer and an activist.

Get well soon, Senator! The country still needs you.

Pinoy Big Briber

2007-11-07T01:59:00.001-08:00

If you want to EVICT the Pinoy Big Briber, click this and VOTE!

Judicial petition for change of sex on the ground of sex reassignment

2007-11-03T00:14:00.000-07:00

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? Does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex?

In particular, may a person successfully petition for a change of sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

These questions were answered by the Supreme Court in the case of Silverio vs. RP, G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007.

On 26 November 2002, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.

He alleged that he is s a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.

From then on, he lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from “Rommel Jacinto” to MELY and petitioner’s gender from “Male” to FEMALE.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision] in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Rommel moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, he elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Ruling

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary.

In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.

Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category “female.”

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

I beg your pardon?

2007-10-30T22:04:00.000-07:00

Much has been said about the presidential pardon on former president Joseph Estrada. While the presidential act is legally defensible, the majority of the Filipinos believe it is morally wrong because it was dictated by political considerations. It was said the granting of pardon was not an act of grace but an act of disgrace to the Presidency. It demeaned the gracious privilege of executive clemency.
For reference, here are some of the FAQs on pardon.

1. What is the legal definition of pardon?

A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. (U.S. vs. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150)

It is an act of pure generosity of the executive and it is his to give or to withdraw before it is completed. No legal power can compel the executive to give it (De Leon vs. Director of Prisons, 31, Phil. 60)

2. What is absolute and conditional pardon?

Absolute pardon is the total extinction of the criminal liability of the individual to whom it is granted without any condition; it restores to the individual his civil and political rights and remits the penalty imposed for the particular offense of which he was convicted.

Conditional pardon is an exemption of an individual, within certain limits or conditions, from the punishment which the law inflicts for the offense he had committed resulting in the partial extinction of his criminal liability.

3. Who may grant pardon?

The 1987 Constitution vests the power to grant pardon only to the President.

4. What are the constitutional provisions on pardon?

Article VII
Executive Department

SEC. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Article IX
Constitutional Commissions

C. The Commission on Elections

SEC. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without a favorable recommendation of the Commission.

5. What are the specific limitations on the pardoning power?

1) Pardon can be exercised only after final conviction.

2) Pardon can be granted for election offenses only upon the recommendation of the COMELEC.

3) Pardon may not be granted in cases of impeachment.

4) Pardon cannot be granted in cases of civil and legislative contempt.

6. Was GMA’s granting of pardon to former president Estrada legal?

Yes, because : 1) Estrada was convicted by final judgment; 2) he was not impeached; 3) he did not violate election laws, rules and regulation; and 4) he was not cited for contempt.

7. There is a school of thought that Estrada should not have been pardoned because he was impeached. It this correct?

No. According to eminent constitutionalist Fr. Bernas, prohibition regarding cases of impeachment can have applicability only if the impeachment process had ended in the imposition of a punishment, which it did not. Joseph Estrada received no punishment from the impeachment that was started against him. The impeachment process was never concluded. In fact, even if it had been concluded, the only punishment he could have received would have been removal from office and disqualification from holding office in the government.

7. May a judicial challenge to the validity of pardon of Estrada prosper?

Fr. Bernas offers the following explanation :

We do have that provision in the Constitution which says that judicial power includes the power “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any instrumentality of agency of the government.” We know and we have seen this applied to independent bodies like the Commission on Elections, the Commission on Appointments and the Electoral Tribunals. It can be applied by the Court to the President even if ever so gingerly.

Did President Arroyo commit such grave abuse of discretion? If we must go by the prescriptions of the Supreme Court, as indeed we must, we will see that it is not easy to commit such mortal sin.

Ponder how the Supreme Court has defined such grave abuse. “By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”

Anyone challenging the validity of the pardon of Estrada will have to measure the action of President Arroyo against this definition. It will not be a walk in the park.

Musings on Proposed Quarry Ordinance in Pampanga

2007-09-13T03:18:00.000-07:00

According to news report, the Pampanga Mayor’s League (PML) has proposed an ordinance seeking a bigger share of revenues for sand-rich municipalities and barangays and stronger regulatory powers over the quarry industry. The Provincial Board tackled the planned measure (Ordinance No. 172)in its regular session on Sept. 10.

Let me share my observations on this proposed ordinance.

1. The proposed ordinance is loaded with defects and fraught with ambiguity.

It lacks adequate authority. No provisions of law are cited to support the proposal that mayors are mandated to regulate quarry industry except Sec. 138 of the LGC, which is now the subject of amendment in Senate Bill No. 1161 being introduced by Sen. Pimentel. The bill seeks to amend various provisions of LCG and requires the promulgation of Implementing Rules and Regulations. With this development, the proposed measure is seemingly premature.

The body of the proposal lacks the salient features of an ordinary ordinance like purposes and objectives, declaration of policy, definition of terms and governing laws.

This ordinance may partake of the nature of tax law which requires holding of public hearing and approval by the Secretary of Finance in addition to the usual requisites of publication of ordinance. (Tuazon vs. CA, 212 SCRA 739). Section 10 of the proposed ordinance is not compliant with this requirement.

The repealing clause practically obliterates all existing ordinances, memoranda, orders and issuance, to wit :

Section 8. Repealing Clause. All previous ordinances, memoranda, orders and issuances by the Province are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.

Section 8 clearly indicates that this ordinance automatically repeals all previous ordinances, memoranda, orders and issuances, meaning all previous ordinances enacted by the first PB up to time this ordinance is approved are no longer existent.

The Repealing Clause should have been worded in this manner :

All previous ordinances, memoranda, orders and issuances by the Province are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance.

The proposed ordinance also violates Sections 42 to 52 of Republic Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) which defines the power of the governor to issue permits (small-scale mining, quarry, commercial sand and gravel, government gratuitous, private gratuitous, guano and gemstone gathering and regulate the mining industry.

2. The Local Government Code (LCG) provides that permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor. This exclusive power carries an ancillary power to regulate the quarry industry. The proposed ordinance, in effect, delimits the regulatory power of the governor over quarry industry.

I feel this is beyond the legal authority of the mayors. It’s a clear ultra vires act which may render the proposed ordinance void if judicially challenged.

3. In paragraph 1 of Section 138 of the LCG, the provincial government “may” collect or levy not more than ten percent (10%) of fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of quarry materials.

This provision is directory in nature in that it gives liberty to the provincial government as to how much of tax is to be levied on quarry resources subject to certain restriction (not more than 10% of fair market value). Based on this, 150 pesos tax on quarry materials per truck load and 150 pesos administrative fees for regulating the industry including the allotment of tax proceeds (45-45-60) was formulated and sanctioned by the Provincial Board and the national government (DENR).

The mayors now want the administrative fee be abolished and their share of the revenues increased by 45 pesos per truck load load. Why only now? Why they did not do so during the incumbency of the Lapids? What’s wrong with the present system? Is it because they are now unable to extract money from extraction of the quarry materials?

While the governor’s exemplary quarry collections has received accolades from countless of Filipinos around the world and prominent journalists, our honorable mayors are now attempting to remove the transparency with which the quarry revenues are being collected by Governor Ed.

Aren’t they proud that the quarry collection is now free from corruption and the quarry monies do not go anymore to the pockets of the governor and other corrupt government officials? What kind of mayors and PB members do we have? How can the province grow when we have grown-up officials who openly undermine the progress we are all dreaming of?

Amnesty is such a lonely word

2007-09-09T23:17:00.000-07:00

GMA issued Proclamation No. 1377 on 6 September 2007 granting amnesty to members of the Community Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) and other communist rebel groups in the country.

The proclamation shall come into force upon concurrence by a majority of all the members of Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Phil Constitution).

What is amnesty?

It’s an action of a government by which all persons or certain groups of persons who have committed a criminal offense, usually of a political nature that threatens the sovereignty of the government, are granted immunity from prosecution. Amnesty allows the State to "forget" criminal acts, usually before prosecution has occurred.

In our jurisdiction, it is defined as an act of grace concurred in by Congress, usually extended to groups of persons who commit political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.

What are the crimes covered by amnesty?

Section 2 of the proclamation provides that the amnesty “shall cover the crime of rebellion and all other crimes included therein or incident thereto in pursuit of political belief as defined by jurisprudence, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws.”

Crimes against chastity, rape, torture, kidnapping for ransom, use and trafficking of illegal drugs and other crimes for personal ends and violations of international law or convention and protocols, even if alleged to have been committed in pursuit of political beliefs are not covered.

What is the difference between amnesty and pardon?

According to eminent constitutionalist Fr. Bernas, the juridical distinction between pardon and amnesty was clearly drawn.

“Amnesty may be granted before conviction or even before charges are filed, whereas pardon can be granted only after final conviction. Pardon after conviction is now at the discretion of the President, but amnesty may be granted by the President only with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. Pardon is generally granted to individuals irrespective of the kind of offenses they may have committed; amnesty on the other hand is offered to a group who generally are political offenders. Amnesty therefore is more clearly a peace and reconciliation instrument.”

In U.S. jurisdiction, there is no specific legislative or constitutional mention of amnesty, making its nature somewhat ambiguous. The difference between amnesty and pardon is particularly vexing. In theory, an amnesty is granted before prosecution takes place, and a pardon after. However, even this basic distinction is blurry— Remember President Ford granted a pardon to President Nixon before the latter was charged with any crime. American courts allow the two terms to be used interchangeably.

Must a person admit his guilt of the offense when a person applies for amnesty?

The earlier doctrine was that a plea of guilty was not needed for availing of amnesty. Now, when a person applies for amnesty he must admit his guilt of the offense which is the subject of such amnesty. If his application is denied, he can be convicted based on this admission of guilt. Many believe that this doctrine should be abandoned especially now in the context of fabricated charges of rebellion or sedition. Fr. Bernas opined that when a person signifies his intention to avail of amnesty, he should be seen as welcoming either relief from punishment for guilt, if truly guilty, or, if innocent, relief from the trouble of having to prove innocence

May the Congress directly grant amnesty?

Under our Constitution, the President shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
In effect, the President alone cannot grant amnesty for it needs the concurrence by majority of all members of Congress.

It appears there’s a blending of power in the manner of the granting of amnesty, that is, the President proclaims the granting of amnesty and the Congress approves such proclamation. By implication, the Congress cannot issue a proclamation granting amnesty to certain individuals and concur on it at the same time. That runs contrary to the letter of the Constitution.

However, I am of the view that Congress may directly grant amnesty. The power to grant amnesty is vested in the legislature and is exercised by legislative grant. Granting of amnesty for strictly political offenses is in the nature of a public law, thus it has the same effect as the repeal of a law punishing an offense.

Political Law : Waterloo of Barristers

2007-09-06T12:02:00.000-07:00

I have this strange feeling that many barristers will get a failing grade in Political Law.

I hate to say this but the barristers met their Waterloo in Poli. Many barristers were kiled by Poli questions, almost half of which are unfairly, perilously and trickily constructed.

Pondering the questions alone would take a considerable amount of time to pull off a right comprehension.

It is hoped the examiners will employ a holistic approach when they check the answers. They should find merit in the manner the arguments are articulated by the examinees no matter how wrong the answers are.

Every bar exams leaves an indelible lesson. A useful piece of practical wisdom that may be acquired in Poli is that a student of law must study all the provisions of the Constitution with equal importance.

Dr. Jovito Salonga - Conscience of the Nation

2007-08-19T07:24:00.000-07:00

I was in grade one when Dr. Jovito Salonga was almost killed in Plaza Miranda bombing. Next to Ninoy, Dr. Salonga, recipient of 2007 Magsaysay award, is my favorite political figure.

When Supreme Court is faced with serious constitutional issue, Dr. Salonga is always called upon to serve as amicus curiae.

He co-topped the 1944 bar exams (95.3%), the highest score in 31 years besting notable topnotchers like Ferdinand Marcos in 1939 (92.35%), Claudio Tehankee in 1940 (94.35%), Diosdado Macapagal in 1936 (89.85%), Celilia Munoz in 1937 (92.60%), Arturo Tolentino in 1934 (89.65), and Manuel Roxas in 1913 (92%)

He is a rare legal luminary who, in writing and in speaking, makes history. He shapes and generates historical events by his words. He stands virtually alone in that distinction.

My cabalen Chief Justice Panganiban paid tribute to Dr. Salonga, his mentor and former boss, in his PDI column dated August 19, 2007 which I have reproduced below.

Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, the country’s oldest living statesman and my personal guru for more than 50 years, launched last Aug. 14 another illuminating, persuasive and life-changing masterpiece. The book’s title, “Not by Power or Wealth Alone,” is its best summation. As an exemplary public servant and brilliant lawyer, he has had a generous share of power and access to wealth in this material world. But in characteristic humility, he declares them thoroughly inadequate to satisfy life and to reform society.

Practised what he preached. Dr. Salonga, a Protestant, has spoken before many congregations, Catholic and Muslim included. He was always eloquent, spoke with the tremolo of infectious conviction, and left his audience with thoughts and reflections that led to action. But that is not all. True, he preached powerfully; but equally true, he practised even more stringently what he preached.

Believing that the Marcos dictatorship plundered not only the public treasury but also the people’s values, he sponsored the enactment of the Ethical Standards Law. Remarkably, in his personal conduct, he went even beyond the requirements of this law or of any known code of ethics.

For instance, when he and his law partners, Sedfrey A. Ordoñez (who became solicitor general, secretary of justice, and ambassador to the United Nations) and Pedro L. Yap (who was elevated to be chief justice of the Philippines), were recruited to public office by President Corazon C. Aquino in 1986, he was not satisfied with taking a leave from his prestigious law firm as demanded by law and ethics; he went all the way and dissolved permanently his law partnership.

In serving a government swept to office by legendary people power, he opted to forego the luxuries that wealth could buy to be able to demonstrate the virtues that power and wealth alone could not bring. He chose to live simply so that others may simply live.

Indeed, he is a living model of his teachings. He is a dedicated husband, a caring father, a faithful friend and a devoted man of God. Never compromising his principles in exchange for friendship, kinship, relationship, power or wealth, he lives an almost ascetic life. He does not smoke, drink, or gamble. Money, worldly pleasures, titles and honors hold no fascination for him.

Outstanding and humble. To say that Dr. Salonga is outstanding is to say something ordinary about him. He topped the bar examinations, topped his doctoral class in Yale University and topped the senatorial elections three times, a record unequaled in this nation’s history. Yet he remains humble and child-like, as our Lord Jesus Christ counseled all His disciples to be. No wonder, he had been selected as one of the seven Ramon Magsaysay awardees this year.

Even when I was his assistant in his law firm in the early ’60s, he was never allured by possessions, positions or propositions. He never quibbled over attorney’s fees; did not bill even his wealthiest clients like Don Eugenio Lopez Sr., leaving to them the problem of how to compensate him. Money had very little meaning for him then, and less so now.

Many of the essays, homilies and speeches included in the book had been written some 35 years ago, after his life was almost snuffed out by that bombing in Plaza Miranda, Manila on Aug. 21, 1971. In it are chronicled his pains, struggles and hopes. But like our Lord Jesus Christ, his faith grew stronger as his physical self felt weaker.

Sprightly at 87. On June 22, 2007, Dr. Salonga celebrated his 87th birthday. Yet, despite his advanced age and despite the many tiny pieces of shrapnel that are still imbedded in his frail body as a result of that grenade blast in Plaza Miranda, he is still sprightly. More important, his intellect and his interest in public welfare are still as sharp as when he was 40. Let me give just two recent proofs of this assertion:

1. Peeved at the Commission on Elections’ refusal to reveal the names of the party-list nominees in the last elections, he sued the poll body for violating the people’s constitutional right to public information; the result: a unanimous Supreme Court decision (in Rosales vs Comelec), promptly promulgated on May 4, 2007, commanding the Comelec to follow his demand; and

2. Alarmed that President Macapagal-Arroyo violated the Constitution in appointing to the Supreme Court someone who was not a natural-born citizen, he again sued; the result: again, a unanimous Supreme Court decision (in Kilosbayan vs Ermita), promptly issued on July 3, 2007, enjoining Gregory Ong from accepting his appointment to the Supreme Court, precisely because of his lack of natural-born citizenship.

Many times during his prayers and moments of solitude, he has asked our Lord why his life had been spared, and why he had been gifted with longevity when he was one of the most injured during that deadly Plaza Miranda blast.

I dare say that our Good Lord had granted him a long and purposeful life, because He wanted him to be the conscience of the nation; to be its fearless anchor during stormy seas of political upheavals; and to be the indefatigable teacher and model of the young and not-so-young who aspire to lead this country.

Jurisdiction in habeas corpus involving custody of minors

2007-08-02T20:59:00.000-07:00

Family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. The Court of Appeals (CA) and the Supreme Court (SC) had not been divested of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. This is the issue in the case discussed below.

Madrinan vs. Madrinan (G.R. 159374, July 12, 2007) - Digest

Facts:

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7, 1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrel, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Albay and subsequently to Laguna.

Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.

Thus, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the three sons in the CA, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.

Petitioner subsequently filed his memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble, it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver.

He also questioned the jurisdiction of the CA, claiming that under Section 5(b) of Republic Act (”RA”) No. 8369 (otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997”), family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.

For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal problems.

The CA rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of the two younger sons who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to eldest son who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision but it was denied.

Issue:

Whether the CA had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus as jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under R.A. 8369.

Ruling:

RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the SC of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in harmony with the provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980″) — that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed by Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.

In this case, after petitioner moved out of their residence, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. By giving the family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation leaving individuals like the respondent without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of RA 8369.

Moreover, under RA 8369, the family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by the family courts under said law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Equitable Mortgage

2007-07-24T22:25:00.000-07:00

An equitable mortgage is one that - although lacking in some formality, forms and words, or other requisites demanded by a statute - nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge a real property as security for a debt and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. Here's an actual case :

Spouses Raymundo et. al. vs. Spouses Bandong (G.R. No. 171250, July 4, 2007) - Digest

Facts : Eulalia Raymundo (Eulalia) was engaged in the business of buying and selling large cattle for which she employed “biyaheros” whose task involved the procuring of large cattle with the financial capital provided by petitioner and delivering the procured cattle to her for further disposal.

In order to secure the financial capital she advanced for the “biyaheros,” Eulalia required them to surrender the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) of their properties and to execute the corresponding Deeds of Sale in her favor.

Dominador Bandong (Domeng), who had been working for petitioner three decades, was not required by Eulalia to post any security in the performance of his work. However, she discovered that Domeng incurred shortage in his cattle procurement operation in the amount of P70,000.00. Domeng and his wife Rosalia then executed a deed of sale in favor of Eulalia a registered parcel of land. On the strength of the aforesaid deed, the subject property was registered in the names of Eulalia and her husband Carlos.

The subject property was thereafter sold by Spouses Raymundo to their grandniece Jocelyn Buenaobra. After the TCT of the subject property was transferred to the name of Jocelyn and husband Angelito, they instituted an action for ejectment against the Spouses Bandong before the MeTC. The lower court ruled in favor of the Spouses Buenaobra which, on appeal, was affirmed in toto by the RTC and subsequently, by the Court of Appeals

To assert their right to the subject property, the Spouses Bandong instituted an action for annulment of sale before the RTC against Eulalia and Jocelyn alleging that there was no sale intended but only equitable mortgage for the purpose of securing the shortage incurred by Domeng in the amount of P70,000 while employed as “biyahero” by Eulalia.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Eulalia and Jocelyn by declaring that the deed of sale valid and, consequently, the subsequent sale between Eulalia and Jocelyn was also lawful. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and found that the transaction entered into by Domeng and Eulalia was not one of sale but an equitable mortgage. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Spouses Raymundo and Buenaobra. Hence, this petition.

Issue : 1) Whether the deed of sale between Domeng and Eulalia is a contract of sale or an equitable mortgage.

Ruling : An equitable mortgage is one that - although lacking in some formality, forms and words, or other requisites demanded by a statute - nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge a real property as security for a debt and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. The instances when a contract - regardless of its nomenclature - may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage are enumerated under Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code.

In executing the said deed of sale, Domeng and Eulalia never intended the transfer of ownership of the subject property but to burden the same with an encumbrance to secure the indebtedness incurred by Domeng on the occasion of his employment with Eulalia. The agreement between Dominador and Eulalia was not avoided in its entirety so as to prevent it from producing any legal effect at all.

Instead, the said transaction is an equitable mortgage, thereby merely altering the relationship of the parties from seller and buyer, to mortgagor and mortgagee, while the subject property is not transferred but subjected to a lien in favor of the latter.

To reiterate, the existence of any one of the conditions under Article 1602 of the New Civil Code, not a concurrence, or an overwhelming number of such circumstances, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage.

Annulment of Marriage

2007-07-24T06:14:00.000-07:00

The rule on annulment of marriage is set forth below.

Before you read the rule, it is important that you understand the meaning of petition for annulment of marriage and void and voidable marriages, which are also enumerated below.

Petition for “annulment” refers to marriages that are merely voidable (they are valid until annulled by the court). On the other hand, a petition for “declaration of nullity of marriage” refers to marriages that are void or not existing from the beginning. For ease and convenience, we will refer to both petitions as “annulment” in its general context.

A) Void Marriages

- Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;

- Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so.

- Those solemnized without license, except those marriage under exceptional circumstances.

- Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41 of FC (subsequent marriage by reason of presumptive death)

- Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other.

- Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53 (failure to record in civil registry)

- A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

- Marriages between ascendants and descendants of any degree and between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood

- Marriages between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; between step-parents and step-children; between parents-in-law and children-in-law; between the adopting parent and the adopted child; between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; between adopted children of the same adopter; and between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)

B) Voidable Marriages

- That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife.

- That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.

- That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.

- That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.

- That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable.

- That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.

C) Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable Marriage.

Section 1. Scope.– This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.–

(a) Who may file.–A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)

(b) Where to file.–The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

(c) Imprescriptibility of action or defense.–An action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.

(d) What to allege.–A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Sec. 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages.–

(a) Who may file.–The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriage based on any of the grounds under Article 45 of the Family Code and within the period herein indicated:

(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent, guardian or person having legal charge of the contracting party, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity; or by any relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner, after coming to reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue influence, within five years from the time the force, intimidation, or undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation, or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage; and

(6) The injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file.–The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Sec. 4. Venue.–The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.–(1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.

If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.

Sec. 6. Summons.–The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and by the following rules:

(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court may order. In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served on the respondent at his last known address by registered mail or any other means the court may deem sufficient.

(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the following data: (a) title of the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d) principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for; and (e) a directive for the respondent to answer within thirty days from the last issue of publication.

Sec. 7. Motion to dismiss.–No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.

Sec. 8. Answer.–

(1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.

(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–

(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Sec. 10. Social worker.–The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and submit the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary.

Sec. 11. Pre-trial.–

(1) Pre-trial mandatory.–A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the report of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.

(2) Notice of pre-trial.–

a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:

1) the date of pre-trial conference; and

2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial
briefs in such manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre-trial.

b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels as well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the pre-trial.

(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer. In case of summons by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last known address.

Sec. 12. Contents of pre-trial brief.–The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:

(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed by law, indicating the desired terms thereof;

(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and authorities;

(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal issues;

(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose thereof;

(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and

(f) Such other matters as the court may require.

Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.

Sec. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.–

(a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.

(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion between the parties. If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Sec. 14. Pre-trial conference.–At the pre-trial conference, the court:

(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement on matters not prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good reasons, the court may extend for a period not exceeding one month.

(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.

Sec. 15. Pre-trial order.–

(a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court shall issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and, except as to the ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the agreements or admissions made by the parties on any of the matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or agreed upon by the parties.

(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following:

(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to Section 16 of this Rule;

(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;

(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be presented;

(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.

(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for the State and take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the proceedings and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.

(d) The parties shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other than those stated in the pre-trial order. The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections or modifications.

Sec. 16. Prohibited compromise.–The court shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such as the following:

(a) The civil status of persons;

(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;

(c) Any ground for legal separation;

(d) Future support;

(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and

(f) Future legitime.

Sec. 17. Trial.–

(1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.

(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the court determines on the record that requiring a party to testify in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would be offensive to decency or public morals.

(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts thereof be made by any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of the court.

Sec. 18. Memoranda.–The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision.–

(1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree if the parties have no properties.
If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of this Rule.

The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded and in the Civil Registry where the Family Court granting the petition for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is located.

Sec. 20. Appeal.–

(1) Pre-condition.–No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.

(2) Notice of appeal.–An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes.–Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

Sec. 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage.–(a) The court shall issue the Decree after:

(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;

(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and

(3) The delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children affected.

Sec. 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence.–

(a) The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report to the court compliance with this requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.

(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their common children.

Sec. 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court.–

(a) In case a party dies at any stage of the proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the case closed and terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper proceedings in the regular courts.

(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.

Psychological Incapacity

2007-07-20T00:50:00.000-07:00

Among the grounds for declaration of nullity of marriage, psychological incapacity is the most commonly used by petitioners, making it the most controversial provision of the Family Code (Article 36).

For better understanding of psychological incapacity, the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code in the case of Republic v. CA and Molina, to wit :

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Writ of Amparo

2007-07-18T00:42:00.000-07:00

Concerned about the growing number of cases of disappearance in the country, the Supreme Court (SC) now contemplates introducing the writ of amparo into the legal system to give more protection to constitutional rights of a person as the petition for habeas corpus has proved not very effective remedy in compelling the state to produce person thought to be victim of disappearance.

In the Philippines, relative of missing person usually seeks legal remedy by filing a petition for habeas corpus, a special proceeding under Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, to compel the state to produce person thought to be victim of disappearance.

However, the SC said recently that petitions for habeas corpus usually end up with state agents simply denying they had the missing person in their custody.
Chief Justice Panganiban explained that the writ of amparo would compel state agents to look for the missing person and the agents would be held liable if they did not exert adequate effort in finding the person.

The writ of amparo or amparo (literally means protection), which was asked in a previous bar exams, is typically Mexican having been first adopted in Mexico in 1857. It is broader in scope and application than the writ of habeas corpus in that it protects a person against illegal arrest and violation of human rights.

In Mexican jurisdiction, the amparo procedure has two parts. The preliminary one – suspension incident – tends to prevent the consummation of alleged violations. The court without emitting any opinion as to whether or not the acts stated really do violate an individual right, suspends their effects so that the final decision granting the amparo may have practical effect. In the other part of the procedure the facts alleged are proved and a study is made of them as to whether or not they violate the rights invoked (The Writ of Amparo, The Mexican Procedure to Protect Human Rights by Carlos Sabchez Mejorada).

Under Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, the SC is clothed with a law-making power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. The provision is intended not only to underscore that constitutional rights are mere declaratory but also enforceable. By virtue of this constitutional grant of power, the SC may adopt the writ of amparo in order to effectively shield a person against the violation of human rights by arbitrary authorities.

2007-07-16T19:23:00.000-07:00

Arson with quadruple homicide and robbery : Is it a complex crime?

During our final examination in Criminal Law II last semester in Harvardian College of Law (Pampanga), the following question was asked:

Harry, an overseas contract worker, arrived from Saudi Arabia with considerable savings. Knowing him to be “loaded,” his friends Jason, Manuel and Dave invited him to a poker session at a rented beach cottage. When he was losing almost his money which to him was his savings of a lifetime, he discovered that he was being cheated by his friends. Angered by the betrayal, he decided to take revenge on the 3 cheats. Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay Rhum and gave it to his companions to drink, as they did, until they all fell asleep. When Harry saw his companions already sound asleep, he hacked all of them to death. Then he remembered the losses. He riffled through the pockets of his victims and got back all the money he lost. He then ran away but not before burning the cottage to hide his misdeeds. The following day, the police investigators found among the debris the charred bodies of Jason, Manual, Dave and the caretaker of the resort.

After preliminary investigations, the provincial prosecutor charged Harry with the complex crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery. Was Harry properly charged?
This student offered the following answer:

Harry was not properly charged. The complex crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery is not defined in Book II (Crimes & Penalties) of the RPC. Harry cannot be charged with a complex crime of robbery with homicide and arson, or any other complex crime for that matter, as his primordial intent was to kill and not to rob. Robbery was conceived only after the killing when he remembered his losses.

Harry should have been separately charged with: 1) a complex crime of multiple murder as a continued crime for the death of Jason, Manuel and Dave qualified by treachery; 2) theft for getting back the money he lost from the 3 victims; and 3) destructive arson for the malicious burning of the cottage for the purpose of concealing or destroying the evidence of the crime resulting to the death of the caretaker. To explain further :

a) Complex crime of multiple murder

A complex crime of multiple murder was committed because Harry perpetrated a series of acts in pursuance of a single criminal impulse or a continued crime. A continued crime is one where the offender performs a series of acts violating same penal provision at the same time and place for the same purpose. This crime is regarded as complex not within the context and contemplation of Art. 48. The SC has extended this class of complex crime to those cases when the offender performed not a single act but a series of acts unless it is a product of a single criminal impulse. Hence, where an accused ran amok and killed several persons, only one crime is committed because the killings were the result of a single impulse.

In the Harry case, the killings were qualified by treachery pursuant to Art. 248 of the RPC, for, in the commission thereof, Harry employed means (intoxicating the victims) which tended directly and especially to ensure the execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victims might make.

b) Theft

Since the victims were already dead when Harry took the money from them, it would be legally impossible to charge him with robbery because one cannot employ force and intimation upon a lifeless body. The proper felony therefore is theft pursuant to Art. 308 of the RPC. All the elements of theft were present when he committed the crime, namely : 1) taking of personal property, 2) belonging to another, 3) taking done with intent to gain, 4) without the consent of the owner, 5) taking be accomplished without use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

In People vs Domingo where the victims were killed, not for the purpose of committing robbery, and the idea of taking the money of the victims was just an afterthought, it was held the accused committed two separate crimes of homicide or murder and theft.

c) Arson

A crime of destructive arson was committed for maliciously burning a private structure (cottage) for the purpose of concealing or destroying the evidence of his crime (Art. 320 of RPC). Harry is not liable for the resultant death of the caretaker because the crime of homicide is absorbed by arson as there is no complex crime of arson with murder.

There are two laws that govern the crime of arson where death results (Art. 320 of the RPC and PD 1613). The Supreme Court held that Art. 320 with respect to destructive arson and the provisions of PD 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom.

2007-07-12T00:43:00.000-07:00

Rape : Insertion of a finger into the genital or anus of another

Republic Act 8353 (R.A. 8353) or the “Anti-Rape Act of 1997″, which amended Chapter III, Title 8 of the Revised Penal Code, expanded the definition of rape. The crime of rape now includes the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any other instrument or “object”, into the genital or anal orifice of another person (Paragraph 2 of Art. 266-A).

Does the INSERTION of a FINGER into the genital or anus of another qualify as RAPE through sexual assault? Let us examine how the executive and judicial departments construed paragraph 2, Art. 266-A, and what was the legislative history of the statute.

A) Executive construction

On 28 September 2000, the Department of Justice (DOJ) came out with its official interpretation of rape through sexual assault and it concluded that the insertion of a finger into a woman’s vagina is not rape under R.A. 8353 (DOJ’s Memorandum Circular No. 22).

B) Judicial Construction

1. People of the Philippines vs. Camilo Soriano (G.R. No. 142779-95, 29 August 2002) – the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding appellant guilty of 12 counts of rape (insertion of his finger into the vagina of his 11-year old daughter) under paragraph 2 of Art. 266-A.

2. People of the Philippines vs. Remario Palma (G.R. No. 148869-74, 11 December 2003) – the appellant is guilty of rape through sexual assault when he inserted his finger into the vagina of his victim. This is one of the significant amendments introduced by the new law, thus making the insertion of any instrument, object, or any part of the human body other than the sexual organ into the genital or anus of another person as rape and not merely acts of lasciviousness.

C) Legislative History of the Statute

There is indication from legislative history of the intention to include “finger” within the contemplation of the phrase “or any other instrument or object”. The Congressional deliberations on the bill could be of help. Here are some excerpts from Senate Deliberations dated 24 July 1996 on Senate Bill No. 950 (now RA 8353).

Senator Sotto : Mr. President, at the outset, may I state that I am in full support of this bill and its intentions. Having said that, may I now be allowed to ask few questions x x x which pertains to the consummation of the crime of rape. Section 3 (referring to the draft bill) states: The slightest contact on any part of his body other than the sexual organ or any object or instrument, or any part of the animal used by the offender with the genital or anus of the offended party under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section 2 shall consummate the crime of rape. I’m concerned, Mr. President x x x May I know what is meant by this phrase and how it is construed x x x. (italics supplied)

Senator Shahani : Yes, Mr. President the slightest contact of any part of the body of a man with the genital or anus of a woman x x x shall consummate the crime of rape. (italics supplied)

Senator Santiago : Mr. President x x x Section 3 redefines rape as committed by any person who shall insert any part of his body other than the sexual organ or who shall introduced any object or instrument into the genital or anus of another. (italics supplied)

The interpretation of DOJ defies the very essence of common sense. It suggests that the insertion of a finger is less offensive than the insertion of other objects into the woman’s genital. The Supreme Court’s definitive construction of RA 8353 has repaired this unsound interpretation.

It is interesting to note that Sen. Kiko Pangilinan had filed Senate Bill No. 1407 on 7 July 2004 introducing amendment to paragraph 2 of Art. 266-A by inserting the phrase “or any other part of the body” immediately after the word “object”. The status of the bill as of 4 January 2007 - read on first reading and referred to Committee on Justice and Human Rights; and Youth, Women and Family Relations.

If this Bill is enacted into law, it shall definitely fortify the judicial interpretation of RA 8353 and make it totally and permanently free from unsound construction.

2007-07-11T07:28:00.000-07:00

Effects of Foreign Divorce on Filipino Spouse

On 17 July 1987, shortly after the signing of Executive Order No. 209 (Family Code), Executive Order No. 227 was also signed into law, amending, inter alia, Article 26 of the Family Code. As so amended, it now states:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Italics supplied)

Article 26, par. 2, is an important innovation belatedly introduced by the Aquino Government, which is intended to extricate the Filipino spouse from an absurd and unjust situation in which he or she is married to someone who is not married to him or her. This provision applies only to cases where at the time of celebration of marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In effect, this provision introduces divorce in our country, much less extends some degree of recognition to foreign divorce, although in exceptional cases.

Significantly, Article 26, par.2 now includes cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry. The Filipino spouse should likewise be permitted to remarry as if the other party were an alien at the time of solemnization of the marriage (Republic vs. Orbecido, GR 154380, 5 October 2005).

Article 26, par.2 may have raised some problems than it solves. A number of questions can be raised with respect to the operation of this provision, to wit:

1. Is there a need for a judicial decree in Philippine courts to declare the Filipino spouse qualified to remarry? The Family Code has no explicit provision to that effect, unlike in cases of void marriages and of a remarriage in case of absence of one of the spouses amounting to presumptive death (Art. 40 and 41, Family Code) where a court decree is required.

2. Is Art. 26, par. 2 applicable to foreign divorces obtained before the effectivity of the Family Code in view of Art. 256?

3. What if the Filipino spouse does not intend to remarry, what is the status of any children they may have after the divorce decree? Does the Filipino spouse have a right to demand support from his/her former alien spouse? What is his/her status with respect to his/her former foreign spouse? Can he/she claim share of property or income acquired by the former foreign spouse.

Moreover, I am of the moral view that the Orbecido doctrine is open to constitutional questions, viz:

1. Is the Orbecido ruling violative of the equal protection of the law clause of the Constitution as it favors only the rich, who may use or abuse the remedy of naturalization as foreign citizen and obtaining a valid foreign divorce and having it recognized in the Philippines in order to terminate his or her marriage with the Filipino spouse given the great difficulty in having a declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage granted at the appellate level of the court?

2. Is the Orbecido ruling tantamount to judicial legislation considering the fact that the Supreme Court has in effect amended Art 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, a substantive law? The OSG had posited that the issue was a matter of legislation and not of judicial legislation, a contention which was not addressed by the Supreme Court in its ruling. Would it not be much more orderly and customary if the Orbecido doctrine be cast in statutory form like the conflicting SC rulings namely People vs. Aragon, Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, and Yap vs. Paras, which were set in stone by Art. 40 of the Family Code?

2007-07-10T06:17:00.000-07:00

Quarry Industry

The governor’s new strategy in the method of collecting quarry tax has scored an enormous point when it turned around the quarry revenues in a period of 5 days.

Wow! 1 million pesos of quarry tax per day is a lot of money.

I have no credible figure how much the daily collection of Capitol from quarry tax was in the previous years to enable me make a more intelligent comparison.

I have, however, read one news report that the Capitol collected a mere 24 million pesos from quarry tax in the year 2002 or around 65,753 pesos per day, which is almost 15 times less than what Among Ed now collects on daily basis.

One can safely assume that more than 90% of the quarry tax collection did not go to the province coffers during the Lapid hegemony.

A while ago I was reading the Supreme Court case of Lito Lapid versus Court of Appeals and Ombudsman et. al. where Lapid was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).

The averment in the factual antecedents of the case reads in part :

“On Oct. 26, 1998, a complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid, Vice-Governor Clayton Olalia, Provincial Administrator Enrico Quiambao, Provincial Treasurer Jovito Sabado, Mabalacat Municipal Mayor Marino Morales and Senior Police Officer 4 Nestor Tadeo with alleged “Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service” for allegedly “having conspired between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry.”

The Ombudsman issued an Order dated January 13, 1999 preventively suspending petitioner Lapid, Olalia, Quiambao, Sabado, Morales and Tadeo for a period of six (6) months without pay.

On Jan. 19, 1999, the Department of the Interior and Local implemented the suspension order.

On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case finding Manuel M. Lapid, Clayton A. Olalia, Jovito S. Sabado and Nestor C. Tadeo administratively liable for misconduct. Marino P. Morales was exonerated from the same administrative charge for insufficiency of evidence. The complaint against respondent Enrico P. Quiambao was also dismissed.

The case went to the Court of Appeals and finally elevated to the Supreme Court. The High Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals in 2000 for its resolution on the merits. I read somewhere that the Ombudsman, the every office who suspended Lapid, dismissed the case prior to the 2004 senatorial elections on the ground that the complaint filed against Lapid et. al. was a mere “hearsay”.

Before the May 2007 elections, the then BM Lilia Pineda filed graft cases against Mark Lapid for alleged ghost deliveries of infrastructure. Much earlier, Guiao sued the younger Lapid for violation of anti-graft and corrupt practices related to the quarry anomaly.

I hope these cases would not end up being dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

2007-07-09T07:00:00.000-07:00

Kapampangan Ku - a song that made Fr. Ed Panlilio a governor

Music is the most powerful medium the world has ever known. Nothing else can influence the way we feel, think, behave and live like music can. It is said that music helps change a government and win a crusade, a struggle or a cause. Notable music such as Jose Corazon de Jesus’s Bayan Ko, Woody Guthrie’s This Land Is Your Land, Bob Dylan’s Blowin’ In the Wind, Cat Steven’s Peace Train, John Lennon’s Imagige and even Nena’s 99 Luftbaloons, among others, have drawn forth protests and dissents from listeners.

The emotive stanzaic song “Kampampangan Ku” evokes a vivid impression of Kapampangan’s cultural and political reality. It elicits a feeling of hope and unity and calls up or summons all Kapampangan to effect change. The genius of the song is the most powerful MESSENGER of Among Ed’s crusade, much more potent than the Pineda’s and Lapid’s four Gs – gold, goons, guns and glitters (movie stars). The song has inspired many uninspired poor in the remote barrios, aroused the disenchanted middle class in the city and awaken the pragmatic rich people in gated subdivisions.

This inspirational song must be sung everyday by our children and our children’s children like the Lupang Hinirang in order to bolster and foster the Kapampangan’s sense of outspokenness, religiosity and courage and preserve the spirit of volunteerism we have recently shown to the whole world.

It is my humble suggestion that this song be sung in schools, government offices and even in cinemas and that an enabling ordinance be enacted making “Kapampangan Ku” Pampanga’s provincial anthem.

See the lyrics of the song in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kapampangan_Ku

2007-07-09T00:46:00.000-07:00

Can Trillanes post bail?

Researching jurisprudence relevant to Trillanes right to bail, I have found out that a military does not enjoy the right to bail. The reason for this is that because of the disciplinary structure of the military and because soldiers are allowed the fiduciary right to bear arms which can cause great havoc, tradition has recognized the non-existence of the right to bail. Nor can appeal be made to the equal protection clause because equal protection applies only to those who are similarly situated. (Comendador, et. al vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991)

However, the circumstance of Sen. Trillanes is quite unique. He has been elected senator while on military detention. The election of Trillanes as senator, being an overwhelming expression of popular will, cannot be rendered useless by the police power of the state. To deny Trillianes of the right to bail will preclude him from performing his constitutional duties, which is, in my view, amounts to suspension or removal and mocks the mandate entrusted to him by the people.

I believe it is time to revisit the aforementioned jurisprudence.

(N.B. This is the sole opinion of the author. Other opinions, concurring or dissenting, are most welcome.)